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The capital markets are expected to play a pivotal role in the attainment of Kenya’s 
development blueprint ‘vision 2030.’ It is, therefore, essential that obstacles to the attainment 
of a fair and efficient market are examined and rooted out. This study investigates the 
limitations of the Capital Markets Act in combating insider trading. It also examines whether 
reforms would promote a fair and efficient capital market.   
The study makes use of existing literature as well as decided cases to investigate the 
inadequacies in the formulation of and provisions for inside information, material price-
sensitive information, publication of information, possession of information and disclosure of 
information in the Capital Markets Act. This literature draws out key learnings from other 
jurisdictions and analyses how legislation in develop d economies treats challenges to the 
enforcement of insider trading laws. The doctrinal analysis is triangulated with results of a 
survey of practical experiences of legal practitioners in applying the Capital Markets Act. 
The findings affirm the existence of conceptual difficulties in determining the elements of the 
crime of insider trading. As a consequence, it is concluded that the present formulation of 
insider trading law is inadequate. The study, therefore, makes suggestions for reforms to the 








CMA:  Capital Markets Authority. 
FSB: Financial Services Board. 
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DEFINITION OF TERMS:  
A capital market is a financial market in which financial assets with a maturity term of more 
than one year are traded. It consists of both the primary market where newly issued securities 
are distributed among investors, and the secondary m rkets where already existent securities 
are traded.1 While a bond market handles the buying and selling of debt securities, a stock 
market typically handles the buying and selling of c mpany stocks and other securities. 
Companies, financial institutions or governments issue bonds as a means of borrowing long-
term funds. They are normally issued for a fixed number of periods and are repayable on 
maturity. 
An efficient market is one in which prices fully reflect all available information on a stock 
market, and all market participants are privy to the information; therefore no investor has an 
advantage in predicting the return on stock.2 
Information  asymmetry refers to the information imbalance between financi l service 
providers and the investors they deal with. An example is corporate officers, company 
directors and persons in similar positions who generally have access to information that may 
not be available to all investors. Those persons with easy and or prior access to this 
                                                           
1 Capital Markets Authority website.  
<http://www.cma.or.ke/index.php?=option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=22&itemid=30> Accessed 30 
June 2010. 
2 S. M. Bainbridge, ‘An Overview of Insider Trading Law and Policy: An Introduction to the Insider Trading 
Research Handbook’ [2012] No. 12-15 UCLA School of Law, Law-EconResearch Paper Series 1-37, 26. < 




information may profit from it before public release.3 Public policy-making bodies have 
attempted to alleviate this phenomenon by prohibiting such trading activities of insiders. 
The term insider is generally used to describe people who by virtue of their relationship with 
the company have privileged access to information about the company and its affairs that are 
not generally known to the public or securities market.4 This information may be used by a 
person either to buy securities at their current price before the information becomes public and 
causes prices to rise, or to sell securities at their current price before  the price falls when that 
information becomes public.  
Insider trading  refers to buying, selling and dealing in shares and securities of a listed 
company by insiders such as directors, officers of management team, employees of the 
company or any other connected persons such as auditors, consultants, lawyers, analysts who 
possess material inside information which is not avail ble to the investing public.5 
Investor protection refers to the protection accorded to shareholders and creditors by the 
legal system. Investors obtain certain rights or powers when they finance firms, for instance 
the right to receive certain corporate information. All non-controlling investors need their 
interests and rights protected if they are to reap the justified benefits of their investment. 
Outside investors face the risk that returns on their investments will never materialize. This is 
                                                           
3 George .E. O, Akingunola R.O, and Oseni J.E, ‘The Influence of Information Asymmetry on Initial Public 
Offers in the Nigerian Stock Market’ [2012] (92) International Research Journal of Finance and Economics 32-
42, 34. < http//www.internationalresearchjournaloffinanceandeconomics.com> Accessed 12 October  2012. 
4 N. Walter, ‘Prioritizing Enforcement in Insider Trading’, (2012) (30) 2 Yale Law and Policy Review, 521-530, 
522. < SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2140867> Accessed on 30 October 2012. 
5 V. Sharma, ‘Prohibition on Insider Trading: A Toothless Law?’(Law School Research Paper No. 996, 
University of London-Centre for Commercial Law Studies 2009) 5. < SSRN: http//ssrn.com/abstract=1400824> 
Accessed 19 January 2010. 
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because of the possibility of expropriation by the managing and controlling shareholders, 
often referred to as the “insiders.”6  
Participants in the capital markets include investors: both individual and corporate, issuers, 
stockbrokers and investment banks and the market regulator. An issuer is a publicly traded 
company, one that raises money by issuing its own stock. Stockbrokers are intermediary 
institutions that assist investors to trade shares t the stock exchange, while investment banks 
are also investment intermediaries, but with a wider mandate that includes authority to buy 
shares in their own name.  
Securities regulation as used in this paper refers to the creation by government, state 
authorities and self-regulatory organizations of rules, standards and controls that aim to shape 
or prohibit certain behaviour, decision-making and transactions in financial markets and 
institutions. 
                                                           
6 N. Walter, ‘Prioritizing Enforcement in Insider Trading’, (2012) (30) 2 Yale Law and Policy Review, 521-530, 
521, 522. < SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2140867> Accessed on 30 October 2012. 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: A BROAD OVERVIEW AND LAYOUT OF RESEARC H 
“I realise the important role of the capital markets in accelerating the raising of capital to finance investment 
in key areas such as infrastructure to help propel Kenya to middle income status by year 2030.”7 Mr. Kungu 
Gatabaki, newly appointed chairman of the Capital Mrkets Authority. 
 
Kenya’s new long term development blue-print ‘Kenya vision 2030’ aims to create a 
globally competitive and prosperous country with a igh quality of life by the year 2030. A 
key sector under this development blueprint is the creation of a vibrant financial sector 
which is to be achieved through the deepening of financial markets by raising institutional 
capital and tapping international sources of capital.8 This deepening of financial markets 
has generally been found to promote economic development and it is also the case that 
well-functioning capital markets are known to increas  economic efficiency, investment 
and growth.9  
Indeed, the importance of capital markets to an economy should not be underestimated 
since capital markets provide a mechanism by which businesses obtain equity capital and 
long term loans from the public. These markets ensure an efficient transfer of monetary 
resources from those who save money towards those who need capital.  Also, from the 
investors’ perspective, joint stock companies facilitate fast, safe and simple way of transfer 
of property through the sale and purchase of shares in the stock market. Thus, the stock 
market facilitates investment in financial assets. In addition, it provides a gateway into 
                                                           
7 Nation Reporter, ‘Vision 2030 to Guide New CMA Chair’ Business News, Daily Nation (Nairobi 16 June 
2011), 33. 
8 Government of Kenya, Kenya Vision 2030 (Ministry of Planning and National Development, Nairobi 2007) 
76.  
9 R. Ngugi et al, ‘Capital Market, Financial Deepening and Economic Growth in Kenya’ (Conference Paper) 




Kenya for global and foreign portfolio investors, which is critical in supplementing the low 
domestic saving ratio.10  
It is noteworthy that our development blueprint recognises that a strong regulatory 
framework promotes public investor confidence, enhances market integrity and is 
conducive for companies and financial markets to become internationally competitive.11 
This is in keeping with the public interest theory f regulation which states that regulatory 
frameworks ensure market abuse such as insider trading does not thrive.12 Insider trading, 
which is the focus of this study, is generally prohibited because it favours few insiders 
with advantageous information while denying the same to the public.  
The public interest theory of regulation referred to above also posits that legal reform is 
deemed necessary where such abuses are not contained. This is because they would 
otherwise undermine public investor confidence, market integrity and global 
competitiveness. It is in consonance with this view that many countries that have adopted 
insider trading legislation, including Kenya, continue to reform these legislation.  
In the case of Kenya, the Capital Markets Act expressly prohibits insider trading and 
establishes this practice as a criminal offence. Despit  this prohibition, there have been 
very few prosecutions and none of these have been succe sful partly due to challenges 
faced in the prosecution process. It is within this context that this study investigates the 
                                                           
10 Ibid. 
11 Government of Kenya, Kenya Vision 2030 (Ministry of Planning and National Development, Nairobi 
2007) 76. 
12 R. A. Posner, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ [1974] 5(2) The Bell Journal of Economics and 




challenges in the prosecution of the offence of insider trading and examines whether 
reforms would as a result promote a fair and efficient capital market.   
Due to resource constraints, the focus of this study is narrowed to challenges arising out of 
the legal provisions on insider trading. It is, however, acknowledged that although the 
legal framework is of immense importance, the development of a vibrant capital market 
requires a lot more than an adequate legal framework.13 
1.1.  Background to the Study 
Dealing in shares and stocks in Kenya started in the 1920’s as a sideline business 
conducted by accountants, auctioneers, estate agents and lawyers.14 The Nairobi Stock 
Exchange, the country’s only securities exchange, was established in 1954 through 
registration as a voluntary association of stockbroe s under the Societies Act and was 
subsequently incorporated as a company limited by guarantee.15 As is the case with a 
number of other securities exchanges around the world, the Nairobi Stock Exchange was a 
mutual exchange owned by its members who acquired such membership by owning seats 
on the exchange. At the dawn of independence, activity in the exchange slumped due to 
the uncertainty of trading conditions in a newly independent Kenya. After independence, 
however, Kenya achieved sustained economic growth and there were a number of highly 
oversubscribed public issues of shares. Share prices fell with the inflation resulting from 
the oil crisis in 1972.  
                                                           
13 J. Gakeri, ‘Enhancing Securities Markets in Sub-Sahar n Africa: An Overview of the Legal and 
Institutional Arrangements in Kenya’ [2011] 9 (1) International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 
134-169, 136< http//www.ijhssnet.com/journals/vol_1_9_Special Issue_July2011/18.p.d.f> Accessed 12 July 
2012. 
14 Nairobi Securities Exchange Website< www.nse.co.ke> Accessed 20 November 2012. 
15 J. McFie, ‘High Quality Financial Reporting: The Case of the Nairobi Stock Exchange’ (Lambert 
Academic Publishing, Germany 2010) 90. 
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Over the years, concerns have raised about inadequate corporate governance standards and 
poor performance as an exchange and more specifically regarding the ownership and 
directorship structure where a significant number of the directors of the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange are stock brokers and ownership was pegged to trading privileges.16  This 
pointed to inherent conflict of interest between the owners, the members and the 
management.  
As is the trend in exchanges worldwide, it was proposed that demutualization would 
restructure the governance at the Nairobi Stock Exchange.17 By separating ownership 
rights from trading rights, board appointments would be by the shareholders of the 
exchange rather than by appointment on the basis of membership to the exchange. It was, 
therefore, hoped that that the resultant board would be a representative board comprised of 
individuals who have the knowledge, capacity, skill, experience and expertise to take 
decisions that are in the best interest of the stock ex hange, relevant stakeholders and the 
market as a whole and not merely for the benefit of he individual interests groups and 
member companies which the directors might feel they have the obligation to represent.  
The demutualization process commenced in 2005 and in July 2011, the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange Limited changed its name to the Nairobi Securities Exchange Limited thereby 
reflecting the evolution into a full service securities exchange.18 In September 2011 the 
Nairobi Securities Exchange, as part of the demutualization efforts, converted from a 
                                                           
16 VIPsight Archives Africa – Kenya 
<http://vipsight.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22&Itemid=68&lang=en> Accessed 
on 20 November 2012. 
17 The Finance Act 2010 which came into force on January 1, 2011 contained amendments to the Capital 
Markets Act and in particular, Section 20 of the Capital Markets Act (Cap. 485A) was amended to provided 
that a securities exchange licensed under the Act should be incorporated as a company limited by shares. 




company limited by guarantee to a company limited by shares and adopted a new 
Memorandum and Articles of Association reflecting the change.19 The impact of these 
efforts remains to be realized. 
With regard to its regulatory framework, the Rules and Regulations of the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange were published in 1954, reprinted with amendments in 1981 and subsequently 
revised. The Exchange published its listing manual in 2002. The ‘Continuing Listing 
Obligations applicable to all Market Segments’ reproduces the Fifth Schedule of The 
Capital Markets (Securities) (Public Offers, Listing and Disclosures) Regulations 2002, 
drawn up by the Capital Markets Authority, and is stated as such.20 
The Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) is a self-regulatory organization and is the 
secondary market and the sole licensed trading exchange in the country. It is supervised by 
the Capital Markets Authority (CMA). All applications for listing at the stock exchange 
must be approved by the CMA, and are subject to NSERules and Regulations.  
Meanwhile, the Capital Markets Act and subsidiary legislation governing takeovers and 
mergers, collective investment schemes, foreign investors, and guidelines on corporate 
governance makes up the core regulatory framework for capital markets and securities in 
Kenya. The Capital Markets Authority Act was promulgated in 1989.21 It established a 
capital markets and securities regulatory body, the Capital Markets Authority (CMA), 
which was set up in the same year. Subsequently in July 2000, the Capital Markets 
                                                           
19 Nairobi Securities Exchange Website <http://www.nse co.ke/media-center/press-release.html?start=120> 
Accessed 20 November 2012. 
20 Ibid. 
21 J. McFie, ‘High Quality Financial Reporting: The Case of the Nairobi Stock Exchange’ (Lambert 
Academic Publishing, Germany 2010) 91. 
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Authority Act was amended to include new provisions expanding the powers of the 
authority.22 It was renamed the Capital Markets Act.  
The systematic development of Kenya’s capital markets and securities can be traced back 
to a government decision in 1980 to cut back on the op rations of the public enterprise 
sector in order to broaden the base of ownership and enhance capital market development.  
In 1984, the International Finance Corporation and the Central Bank of Kenya conducted a 
study on the “Development of Money and Capital Markets in Kenya.” This study became a 
blueprint for structural reforms in the financial markets. It recommended the need to 
develop capital markets in order to facilitate long term capital.23 Further, the government 
indicated its commitment in facilitating growth of the capital market reform in late 1980s, 
which saw the introduction of institutional and policy reforms.24 
The Capital Markets Act establishes the Capital Markets Authority as the statutory 
regulator, with the objective of promoting, regulating and facilitating the development of 
an orderly, fair and efficient market in Kenya.25 Another objective of the Capital Markets 
Authority is the protection of investor interests, for instance through the prohibition and 
criminalisation of insider trading.26 This is because investors need protection given that 
they are often faced with the possibility of investing their money in entities which expose 
                                                           
22 J. Gakeri, ‘Enhancing Securities Markets in Sub-Sahar n Africa: An Overview of the Legal and 
Institutional Arrangements in Kenya’ [2011] 9 (1) International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 
134-169, 142< http//www.ijhssnet.com/journals/vol_1_9_Special Issue_July2011/18.p.d.f> Accessed 12 July 
2012 
23 R. Ngugi et al, ‘Capital Market, Financial Deepening and Economic Growth in Kenya’ (Conference Paper) 
3. < Stable URL: http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2009-EDiA/papers/513-Isaya.pdf> Accessed 12 
February 2010. 
24 See Government of Kenya, Sessional Paper No1 of 1986 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth 
(Ministry of Planning and National Development, Nairobi 1986). 
25 Capital Markets Act preamble. 
26 Capital Markets Act s 11(d). 
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their investment to unnecessary risks, mismanagement or lack of accountability thereby 
imposing agency costs on them. 27  
The Capital Markets Act is the law governing insider trading in Kenya. This Act prohibits 
insider trading, stipulates the statutory defences and sets out the sanctions for insider 
trading.  It makes the CMA responsible for the licensing, regulation and supervision of all 
capital markets participants.28 The Act also disseminates rules and regulations and is 
empowered to carry out enforcement and sanctions.  
In the enforcement of existing laws, the courts in Kenya have recognised that the rationale 
behind the prohibition of insider trading is the promotion of market integrity by enhancing 
an orderly and fair operation of the market.29 This was highlighted during the country’s 
first trials for insider trading in which Bernard Mwangi Kibaru and Terrence Davidson 
were unsuccessfully prosecuted. These formed the basis of concern over the adequacy of 
existing insider trading legislation in Kenya.30   
This study will make use of the challenges in the prosecution of the two cases to 
investigate the limitations of the Capital Markets Act in combating insider trading in 
Kenya with a view to charting a path for reform. 
                                                           
27 K. Mwaura, ‘The Failure of Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises and the Need for 
Restructured Governance in Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: The Case of Kenya.’  [2007] 31 (14)
Fordham International Law Journal-34-75, 40.          
<http//ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj> Accessed 5 January 2010. 
28 The Capital Markets Authority also supervises the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE). 
29 Republic versus Bernard Mwangi Kibaru, Nairobi CMCC 1337 of 2008, 8. 
30 P. Wanyama, ‘Kenya: Why Law on Insider Trading Needs Urgent Overhaul,’ Business Daily (Nairobi) 
(Nairobi 29 November 2010).  < http://www.propertykenya.com/news/1391618-cobrand!- > accessed 




1.2.  Research Problem 
Kenya aspires to create a vibrant and globally competitive financial sector by deepening its 
financial markets. The achievement of this goal is, however, threatened by the existence of 
market abuses such as insider trading, which are known to render capital markets 
unattractive to potential investors and which may lead to the loss of existing investors.  
Although the Capital Markets Act prohibits an insider from trading while in possession of 
information which is non-public and price-sensitive, this prohibition is plagued by several 
challenges. These arise due to ambiguity in the formulation of the set of facts that must be 
proven beyond reasonable doubt in order to convict a defendant for the crime of insider 
trading. These facts are that the defendant was an insider; that the defendant transacted 
while in possession of inside information and that t e information in question was price-
sensitive and had not been disclosed to the public.   
Currently, the existence of this set of facts is very difficult to prove mainly due to the 
conceptual cloudiness with which the offence of insider trading is formulated. The concept 
of price-sensitive information is plagued with vagueness and ambiguity and there are no 
objective criteria for determining whether a corporate entity can be said to be in possession 
of information, as well as for determining whether or not this information is public. These 
conceptual obscurities raise evidentiary difficulties for the prosecution and enable accused 
persons to easily raise doubts as to the existence of any element of the crime in order to 
obtain an acquittal.  
A likely consequence of this situation is the preval nce of insider trading and consequently 
a lowered investor confidence in our capital markets hence operating as a drawback to the 
achievement of the aspirations set out in the natiol development blueprint. 
22 
 
In a nutshell, this study examines the extent to which weaknesses in the provisions relating 
to insider trading in the Capital Markets Act hinder the prosecution of this offence. 
1.3.  Literature Review 
The literature review commences with the discussion on why insider trading is viewed as a 
problem in this paper. It then examines literature on enforcement of insider trading law and 
notes the paucity of relevant literature on the financial market in Kenya. It thus moves on 
to learnings from other jurisdictions and analyses how literature on insider trading in other 
developed markets treats challenges to the enforcement of insider trading laws. Finally, it 
narrows down on the knowledge gap which is the focus of the paper. 
To begin with, a considerable amount of seminal works have been published around the 
academic debate on insider trading. Several arguments are presented against insider 
trading; the most common of which is that insider trading is ‘unfair.’ This is because 
insiders obtain access to and are able to obtain profit f om information to which other 
market participants lack access.31 Secondly, insider trading hampers the company’s 
potential to attract more investors because the public may begin to perceive the financial 
markets as scams.32  They then lose faith in the stock market and decide to put their 
savings elsewhere, making firms unable to raise capital through stock issues. Thirdly, 
insider trading damages investor confidence in the integrity of the financial markets where 
a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust exists because this trust is breached when an 
                                                           
31 See for example E.M.Cinar ‘The Issue of Insider Trading in Law and Economics: Lessons for Emerging 
Markets in the World’ [1999] 19 (4) Journal of Business Ethics 345-353, 346.    
<http//www.jstor.org/stable/25074103>Accessed on 31 July 2009; J. Hartmann, ‘Insider Trading: An 
Economic and Legal Problem.’ <http://www.gonzagajil.org/pdf/volume1/Hartmann/Hartmann.pdf> 
Accessed 5 August 2010; H. McVea, ‘What’s wrong with insider dealing?’ [1995] 15(3) Legal Studies 390-
414. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.748-121X.1995.tb00527.x> Accessed 1   August 2010. 
32 See D.W. Carlton.  and D.R. Fischel, “The Regulation of Insider Trading”, (May 1983) 35 (5) Stanford 
Law Review 857-895. <Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1228706> Accessed 29 July 2009. 
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insider trades in the securities of the company based on corporate confidential information 
for personal gain.33 Fourthly, it is argued that insider trading delays the flow of 
information since a manager who wants to profit from information must withhold it from 
colleagues until after his stock transactions. 34 Such delay of transmission of information 
within the firm potentially hampers decision-making and the taking of corporate action in 
the firm thereby causing injury to the firm. This may further injure the firm’s reputation 
when it becomes widely known as an ‘insider’s firm’. Fifthly, insider trading is likely to 
lead to a conflict of interests between a firm and its managers, as insider managers tend to 
work for their own interests and not that of the firm or shareholders. 
On the other hand, there are economists and legal scho ars who contend that laws making 
insider trading illegal should be revoked.35 These include Henry Manne, Milton Friedman, 
Thomas Sowell, Daniel Fischel and Frank H. Easterbrook. They hold the view that insider 
trading based on information which is material and non-public benefits investors in general 
by more quickly introducing new information into the market. Other arguments are that 
insider trading is the most appropriate form of compensation package in terms of financial 
benefits arising from trade in securities, thereby providing incentives for managers. This 
policy debate is rehashed by later authors.36 
                                                           
33  See E.M.Cinar ‘The Issue of Insider Trading in Law nd Economics: Lessons for Emerging Markets in 
the World' [1999] 19 (4) Journal of Business Ethics 345-353, 347.    
<http//www.jstor.org/stable/25074103>Accessed on 31 July 2009. 
34 See H. McVea, ‘What’s Wrong with Insider Dealing?’ [1995] 15(3) Legal Studies 390-414,405. 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-121X.1995.tb00527.x> Accessed 1   August 2010. 
35 See for example H. G. Manne, ‘The Case for Insider Trading.’ (March 2003) The Wall Street Journal 
Online 1-3.<http://people.wku.edu/indudeep.chhachhi/519files/519hout/Instr0303.pdf> Accessed 1 August 
2010; D.W. Carlton.  and D.R. Fischel, ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading’ (May 1983) 35 (5) Stanford Law 
Review 857-895, 857. <Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1228706> Accessed 29 July 2009. 
36 S. M. Bainbridge, ‘An Overview of Insider Trading Law and Policy: An Introduction to the Insider 
Trading Research Handbook’ [2012] No. 12-15 UCLA School of Law, Law-EconResearch Paper Series 1-
37, 24-34. < SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141457> Accessed on 30 October 2012. 
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It is noteworthy that there is practically no empirical evidence indicating that insider 
trading is the most efficient and accurate form of c mpensation.37 Indeed, despite the 
foregoing academic debate, all major economies have legislation prohibiting insider 
trading and these are supported by varying policy backgrounds. For example, insider 
trading has been criminalised in the United Kingdom in part so that there is no inequality 
of bargaining power between one party who has inside information which the other party 
could not have, and also so as to preserve a perception of market integrity among 
investors.38  
Thus, this widespread legislation is in keeping with the general view that allowing insiders 
to trade at the expense of uninformed outsiders diminishes investor confidence and hurts 
the integrity of the capital markets. It is for these reasons that this paper takes the position 
that insider trading should indeed be prohibited.  
In the local context, literature on various aspects of capital markets in Kenya includes 
research on the role of the legal and institutional fr mework in securities markets 
governance and investor protection, the need for high quality disclosure and the adequacy 
of regulation of capital market intermediaries.39 
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Among these studies is Jacob Gakeri’s exploration of the role of legal norms in the 
enhancement of securities markets in Kenya.40 He postulates that appropriate legal and 
institutional frameworks are necessary for securities markets to thrive and deepen. He 
highlights that the legal framework must facilitate th  proper functioning of the securities 
markets by ensuring that relevant disclosure requirments are complied with.  
Gakeri further argues that whereas developing jurisdictions can learn from legal regimes of 
jurisdictions with deep and vibrant securities markets, such laws should not be replicated 
without testing their appropriateness. He asserts that rules and institutions that function 
well in one country may not be appropriate in another because of the absence of supportive 
norms and corresponding institutions. This factor is recognised in this paper while 
gathering strengths of insider trading legislation in various jurisdictions for their 
comparative value. These strengths provide a point f reference for proposing 
improvements to Kenya’s law only where weaknesses or gaps have been identified. In this 
way, Kenya’s legal framework is brought in line with developments globally.  
One of the weaknesses an emerging economy is likely to experience lies in the quality of 
information and its disclosure.41 In relation to this, James Mc Fie investigates the meaning 
of high quality financial reporting and examines diclosure in annual reports of forty seven 
companies listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange to see if it can be described as “high 
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quality.” 42 He finds that the use of International Financial Reporting Standards is a vital 
factor in assisting companies move towards high quality disclosure. His book is relevant 
because he provides unique insight into the Capital M rkets Authority regulations and 
Nairobi Securities Exchange requirements on disclosure and assesses them in light of 
international standards. The present study will analyse Kenya’s formulation of the legal 
provisions on insider trading and in that process assess the adequacy of existing disclosure 
requirements to Kenya’s markets. 
Whereas literature on Kenya’s capital markets is silent on enforcement of the law, 
countries with developed markets appear to have more studies and publications on the 
enforcement of existing insider trading laws explaining challenges they have faced with 
regard to the elements of the offence of insider trading and how these were overcome. 
These works also point to varying approaches in the application and enforcement of the 
law on insider trading from which Kenya can draw, taking into account the underlying 
variations and differences.  
How does literature on insider trading in developed economies treat challenges to the 
enforcement of insider trading laws? Howard Chitimira critically assesses the South 
African Securities Services Act. This Act came into effect in February 2005 and 
consolidated the law relating to the regulation and control of exchanges and securities 
trading such as the Stock Exchanges Control Act, the Financial Services Board Act, the 
Financial Markets Control Act and the Custody and Administration of Securities Act.43  
He notes that the new Act was aimed at introducing adequate and more effective 
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43  H. Chitimira, ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Roadmap for Effective, Competitive 
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legislation to free the South African financial markets and companies from illicit practices 
such as insider trading. Although some amendments and new offences for market abuse 
practices were introduced by the Securities Services Act, Chitimira observes that many 
deficiencies in the Insider Trading Act of 1998 Act were simply carried over into the New 
Act. He therefore seeks to investigate and expose these deficiencies for purposes of 
recommending practical measures that may be taken to resolve the insider trading problem 
in South Africa. While Chitimira highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the new Act, 
he explains that the new Act retains many weaknesses of the previous Act with little or no 
changes to them. 
With regard to insider information, Chitimira notes that the South African Act presents 
knowledge on the part on the insider that he has inside information as a prerequisite for 
liability without requiring that the defendant be shown to have deliberately exploited the 
inside information in concluding the illicit transaction.44  Although the regulators would 
have to prove that the defendant was aware that his information was inside information, he 
observes that this removes the overwhelming evidentiary difficulties which would 
otherwise be placed on regulators to prove that the def ndant had deliberately exploited the 
inside information.45  
Further, the Securities Act retains the criteria to be used in determining what information 
qualifies as ‘inside information’. 46 The first criterion is that the information ought to be 
specific or precise. Therefore, market transactions based on vague or general information, 
                                                           
44 South African Securities Services Act s 73 and 77. 
45 H. Chitimira, ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Roadmap for Effective, Competitive 
and Adequate Regulatory Statutory Framework’ (LLM Thesis, School of Law at University of Fort Hare 
2008) 78. <http://hdl.handle.net/10353/230> Accessed 1 October 2011. 
46 South African Securities Services Act s 74. See rep aled Insider Trading Act s 3.
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rumours, suspicion, conjecture, speculation or combination thereof do not fall within the 
purview of the Act.  
The second criterion is that information must be of a non-public nature in order to ground 
liability; the Act provides ample guidance to assist in making the determination that 
information has been stripped of its non-public character. Any information is regarded as 
having been made public when it is published in accordance with the rules of the relevant 
regulated market to inform investors and their advisors; when contained in public records 
maintained by the relevant statutory regulator; when it can be readily acquired by those 
likely to deal in securities; or is derived from information which has been made public. 
Information may be regarded as having been made public even if it can only be acquired 
by persons exercising diligence, or expertise or by o servation; it is communicated to a 
section of the public and not to the public at large; it is communicated only on payment of 
a fee or it is only published outside the republic. Thus, prompt disclosures of new 
developments by insiders may significantly reduce their exposure to liability for the use of 
such information in their market transactions. The t ird criterion is that the information 
must have been obtained by a person while occupying the status of insider. The fourth 
criterion is that the information ought to be material; information that is likely to have a 
material effect on the price or value of any securities or financial instrument.  
Amongst the flaws Chitimira identifies, and that is relevant to this study, is the absence of 
mandatory disclosure requirements for the reporting of transactions consummated by 
insiders. He also notes that the Securities Services Act does not establish an affirmative 
duty of disclosure for companies or institutions that come into possession of material 
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price-sensitive information. 47 Such requirements make trading by the insiders a matter of 
public record thereby deterring insiders from dealing in non-public material information. 
Such reporting is likely to enhance market efficieny because it enlarges the pool of 
information from which market analysts can draw in performing their tasks. He notes that 
a mandatory duty on insiders would ensure that non-public price-sensitive inside 
information is disclosed in such a way that all stakeholders are given equal access to 
relevant information and at the same time to minimize the possibility of any unfair 
advantage to a few selected persons.  
Chitimira’s assessment of the South African legal and institutional framework in light of 
international developments is a source of useful benchmarks for studying Kenyan 
legislation especially on inside information, and non-public information. The applicability 
of these benchmarks to Kenya’s situation will be examined in this work. This study will 
also assess the extent and adequacy of existing mandatory disclosure requirements in 
Kenya. 
Another author, Vaibav Sharma, studies the Indian securities market and considers why 
there is a poor enforcement rate there despite the xistence of regulation prohibiting insider 
trading.48 He opines that India needs to bring its securities market to the level of the 
security markets of United States (U.S) and the United Kingdom (U.K). These being the 
two largest financial markets of the world, they can act as a guide to the emerging market 
of India.  Although he examines insider trading from the time of first regulation against it 
                                                           
47 H. Chitimira, ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Roadmap for Effective, Competitive 
and Adequate Regulatory Statutory Framework’ (LLM Thesis, School of Law at University of Fort Hare 
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48 V. Sharma, ‘Prohibition on Insider Trading: A Toothless Law?’(Law School Research Paper No. 996, 
University of London-Centre for Commercial Law Studies 2009) 8.  
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in the United States, United Kingdom and India up until the present time, he fails to show 
how the drafting of the Indian Law has contributed o poor enforcement. He is likewise not 
very specific on why the provisions in the old UK law make it difficult to secure 
convictions.  
Among Sharma’s proposals for improving India’s enforcement regime is the reduction of 
disclosure time to one day and that disclosure should be made to both the exchange as well 
as the regulator as opposed to the exchange only. He also suggests the increase in criminal 
penalties to make them more punitive and deterrent as well as the introduction of civil 
penalties based on the profits made or loss avoided, as is done in the United States.  While 
he studies the gap between the enactment and enforcment of insider trading law in the 
Indian context, this paper studies it in the Kenyan co text. The present study will also 
investigate the relevance and applicability of his proposals to the Kenyan context. 
Sharma explains enforcement gaps by the legislative h story of countries; that for the 
United States, the main idea behind the laws was to provide a deterrent effect in society 
and so it was thus expected that no more than a few insider traders would be caught. For 
the United Kingdom, enforcement was quite low until recent years because insiders were 
treated as criminals, giving the prosecution a heavy burden of proof which was difficult to 
discharge. This rendered enforcement costly. He states other factors contributing to the 
low enforcement as legislation which was drafted in such a way as to make enforcement 
well-nigh impossible with the burden of proof being inappropriately placed and the 
standard of proof being too high; agencies charged with administering the law also lacked 
the desire, enthusiasm, resources or expertise to enforc  the law.  
Edward Swan and John Virgo in their more recent work, bserve that the failure of a 
number of high profile criminal trials exposed weaknesses in the UK insider trading laws 
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arising from reliance on criminal penalties which were difficult to prove.49 The difficulties 
in proof arose from the use of concepts that were difficult to define such as “price-affected 
securities”. Indeed the entire criminal prosecution process is considered cumbersome, time 
consuming, and obtaining a conviction requires the proof of the mens rea constituting the 
offence beyond reasonable doubt. The authors note tha  this gap in protection was filled by 
the introduction of express market abuse prohibitions, commonly referred to as ‘the civil 
offence of market abuse’ as well as UK’s implementation of the European Union Market 
Abuse and Insider Trading Directive which required a option of common regulatory 
provisions by all European Union (EU) member States and cooperation between those 
states to prevent market abuse from being initiated in one state and impacting on others. 
These included steps to make markets more transparent, such as requiring the reporting of 
suspicious transactions, disclosing inside information and disclosing insider trades in an 
issuers’ financial instruments among other requirements. 
Swan and Virgo observe that under UK’s Financial Servic s and Markets Act (FSMA), 
information is considered precise if it is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be 
drawn as to the possible effect of circumstances that exist or may reasonably be expected 
to come to existence.50 With regard to publicity, information is said to be generally 
available when it has been disclosed in accordance with the rules of the prescribed market; 
is contained in records open to public inspection or can be accessed publicly via the 
internet or can be obtained by research or analysis.51  
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It is admitted that financial crimes are generally difficult to prove.52 The recognition of 
these practical problems has sometimes resulted in judicial leniency enabling the 
prosecution to secure convictions without meeting its burden of proof on all necessary 
elements of the case.53 As part of the lessons drawn from other jurisdictions, this paper will 
examine the response of the courts to these challenges i  Kenya. 
From the foregoing, this paper identifies a knowledg  gap in the paucity of academic work 
on the challenges faced in the prosecution of the offence of insider trading in the Kenyan 
context. In order to complement existing literature and analysis of the legal framework on 
insider trading in Kenya, primary data will be sourced through questionnaires and follow-
up interviews with key informants at the Capital Markets Authority and legal practitioners. 
1.4.  Theoretical Framework 
 Within the ordinary business context, taking advantage of the less informed position of 
other parties is common and in the absence of misrepres ntation or fraud is rarely 
prohibited. This is especially where such information s acquired through diligence and 
zeal.  
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However, it is a principle of common law that if a director or other officer of a company 
makes use of confidential information acquired as a consequence of his office for his own 
personal gain, he thereby breaches his fiduciary dut to the company and is liable to 
account to the company for any profit made.54 This obligation not to profit from a position 
of trust is a manifestation of the obligation to avoid a conflict arising between duty and 
one’s personal interest. A difficulty arises in applying such conflict of duty and interests to 
insider trading especially in cases where the insider s buying shares from outsiders to 
whom he owes no fiduciary duty. 
The rationale for the criminalisation of insider trading is centred on the debate between the 
two broad schools of thought on insider trading. On the one hand, that insider trading 
enhances market efficiency and on the other hand that it is a demonstration of a lack of 
market integrity. The main reason for criminalisation s to deter insiders from obtaining an 
unfair advantage of inside information and earning profits from the lack of knowledge of 
the outsiders.55 This problem is created when there is asymmetric information, that is, 
managers and other insiders know more about the curr nt condition and future prospects 
and problems of the firm than outside investors. The insiders can exploit this information 
at the expense of investors.56 The concern is with such information being acquired by 
virtue of the insider’s position with the company and where such information is 
                                                           
54 See Green and Clara Pty Ltd v Bestobell Industries Pty Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 1. 
55 See A. Hudson, ‘Criminal Offences in the Law of Finance’ in The Law of Finance (Sweet and Mawell, 
London 2009) 326. 
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unavailable to an outsider no matter what degree of diligence or zeal the outsider 
possesses.  
Thus, parties are held responsible for insider trading because of acquiring information in a 
fiduciary capacity, knowing it was intended for a company, purpose and not for trading for 
personal gain. In addition, they may be held responible because of misappropriating 
information belonging to the issuing company, whether or not that individual is a corporate 
insider.57 
Market regulation could be approached from different perspectives. This is in light of the 
theories that have been advanced to explain government regulation of the economy. The 
two main theories of market regulation are the ‘public interest’ theory and the ‘economic 
theory.’ Richard Posner, a proponent of the public interest theory, holds the view that 
regulation is supplied in response to the demand of the public for the correction of 
inefficient or inequitable market practices.58 This theory encompasses the idea that people 
need protection from business abuses and market failures. The regulatory body is, 
therefore, considered to represent the interest of the general society in which it operates 
rather than the private interests of the regulators. 
On the other hand, according to George Stigler’s economic theory, the original purposes of 
a regulatory program are thwarted through the efforts of the interest group because 
regulatory agencies over time come to be dominated by the industries they regulate. Thus, 
the regulator fails to act in the interest of the general society and focuses only on the 
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interest group that has captured it. Such interest groups include insiders such as market 
professionals and corporate managers at the expense of hareholders and the public 
generally. This theory insists with the political scientists that economic regulation serves 
the private interests of politically effective groups. Considering that insiders form the 
minority group and cannot be said to have captured th  regulatory process with regard to 
insider trading, Stigler’s theory is not considered applicable in this study. 
The theoretical framework within which the problem under study is explored is the public 
interest theory of regulation. Under this theory, laws are promulgated to serve the interests 
of the general public, and where such interests are not served, the laws ought to be 
reformed.    
The public interest theory assumes that markets are ext mely fragile and likely to operate 
very inequitably if left alone, resulting in market failures.  Thus the occurrence of a market 
failure justifies governmental intervention by way of regulation because of the grave 
consequences such failure is likely to have on an economy. Examples of market failures 
include risks posed by information asymmetry, systemic instability, market manipulation 
and misconduct as well as anticompetitive behaviour such as abuse of monopolies.59 
Whereas competition is healthy and highly encouraged b cause of its positive effects on 
product quality and price, regulatory intervention s deemed opportune where competition 
is suppressed through creation of cartels, restriction of entry or exit into the market among 
others. As such, this regulation ameliorates market failures for the benefit of broader civil 
society and is necessary only to the extent to which it orrects the targeted market failure. 
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The public interest theory embraces the correction of market failures as the main criterion 
against which regulatory outcomes are to be assessed. In light of this, theorists call for 
regulatory reform rather than deregulation thereby revealing their basic commitment to the 
position that regulatory failures are not inevitable. 60 
Whereas it is argued that the theory suffers from a lack of supporting empirical evidence as 
well as from significant conceptual vagueness, it enjoys some modest support from the fact 
that regulators sometimes act to further general interests; a phenomenon which might not 
be completely explained by competitor theories.61  
The public interest theory is adopted in this work because securities regulation is viewed 
as having been put in place as a response to market f ilures, more specifically, market 
abuses stemming from information asymmetry. As already stated, this asymmetry arises 
when insiders obtain and make use of information to which general investors do not have 
access.  The public interest view holds that governm nts regulate securities to facilitate the 
efficient functioning of security markets by ameliorating market failures, for the benefit of 
broader civil society. In securities, the public interest would be served if the market system 
allocated information in a socially efficient manner. 
In the case of Kenya, the Capital Markets Act creates offences which are part of the way in 
which the capital market is regulated. These offences form part of criminal law and so the 
enforcement process entails criminal proceedings.62 As is the requirement with criminal 
offences, a formal prosecution is commenced. The def n ant must then be proved to have 
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committed the offence with a ‘criminal intent.’ Further, the offence must be proved by 
evidence which establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This high 
standard must be met if a criminal offence is to be proved. 
The application of the public interest theory of regulation in this work also takes into 
account that the legal system in Kenya is based on the English common law system. The 
reason for this is historical, that Kenya was previously a colony of Great Britain. As such, 
principles of English law and English legal concepts are generally applicable under the 
Kenyan legal system.63 In addition, many of the statutes have been drafted based on 
existing English statutes. Thus, although market failure justifies regulatory intervention 
under the public interest theory of economic regulation, Kenya’s law is likely to have been 
drafted based on market failure experience in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.64 Indeed 
it is observed that regulatory modernization in Sub- aharan Africa has historically not 
been a reaction to crises but is typically a by product of piecemeal reform and replication 
of developments in other jurisdictions.65 
 Thus, the effectiveness of regulatory intervention, though difficult to measure, is gauged 
in this paper by the experience of other jurisdictions in applying similar provisions, the 
extent to which the elements of the crime of insider trading can be proved in order to 
sustain a conviction, as well as the experiences of legal practitioners. 
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64 J. Gakeri, ‘Financial Services Regulatory Modernization in East Africa: The Search for a New Paradigm 
for Kenya’ [2011] 1 (16) International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 161-172, 161< 
http//www.ijhssnet.com/journals/vol_1_9_Special Issue_July2011/18.p.d.f> Accessed 12 July 2012. 
65
  Ibid. 
38 
 
The general approach in this study is that the challenges experienced in the prosecution of 
the offence of insider trading have the effect of promoting information asymmetry; the 
mitigation of these challenges through effective prohibition of insider trading will as a 
consequence ensure the flow of information to the general public. Thus, the purpose of 
securities regulation as viewed from the lens of the public interest theory will have been 
achieved. 
1.5. Objectives  
The objectives of this research are as follows: 
1. To assess whether the legal provisions relating to ‘inside information’ and  
‘material price sensitive information’ impede upon the prosecution of the offence 
of insider trading. 
2. To assess whether the legal provisions relating to ‘public information’ and 
‘possession of information’ impede upon the prosecution of the offence of insider 
trading. 
3. To assess the adequacy of the legal provisions on disclosure of information in 
curbing the offence of insider trading. 
1.6. Research Justification 
Given the pivotal role that the capital markets are expected to play in the attainment of 
Kenya’s development blueprint ‘vision 2030,’ it is mperative that obstacles to the 
attainment of a fair and efficient market are examined and rooted out through legal reform. 
In view of this, the concerns that there have been no convictions based on the existing law 
on insider trading ostensibly due to challenges in the application of the legal provisions in 
the insider trading law ought to be studied and the rel vant law subjected to reform. It is 
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therefore hoped that this study will add to the body f knowledge that will inform the 
reforms in the existing securities legislation. 
1.7. Hypothesis 
The provisions in the Capital Markets Act relating to inside information, material price-
sensitive information, publication of information, possession of information and disclosure 
of information are vaguely formulated and are therefore difficult to prove, thus hindering 
the effective prosecution of the offence of insider trading. 
1.8. Research Questions 
1. To what extent do the legal provisions on ‘inside information’ and ‘material price 
sensitive information’ impede upon the prosecution of the offence of insider trading? 
2. To what extent do the legal provisions on ‘public information’ and ‘possession of 
information’ impede upon the prosecution of the offence of insider trading? 
3. To what extent are the legal provisions on disclosure of information adequate in 
curbing the offence of insider trading? 
1.9. Methodology  
This research is doctrinal and empirical in nature. Whilst the doctrinal approach helps in 
the analysis of legislative provisions, case law and legal principles, the empirical approach 
assists in the collection of data. This is conducted hrough questionnaires that are 
administered to key informants at the Capital Markets Authority and legal practitioners 
because of their experience in application and enforcement of the Capital Markets Act. 
Data sought from the informants includes their experience with and perceptions about 
challenges in the prosecution of the offence of insider trading; more specifically the 
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provisions relating to the meaning of inside information, price-sensitive information, 
material information, publication of information, possession of information by a body 
corporate and disclosure of information. This is then triangulated with the analysis. The 
empirical approach provides a useful complement to the doctrinal approach and sheds light 
on perceptions held by legal practitioners with regard to the legal provisions under study. 
1.10. Chapter Breakdown 
Chapter one provides a broad overview, literature review, theoretical framework, layout 
and methodology of the research.   
Chapter two analyses the legal provisions on insider trading in the Capital Markets Act and 
makes use of case law to illustrate existing challenges to their enforcement.  
Chapter three presents a survey of the shortcomings of existing legislation as experienced 
by legal practitioners in Kenya as well as their views on the proposals for reform. It then 
discusses the findings and draws conclusions. 
Chapter four addresses the challenges posed by inadequ cies in the legal provisions 
identified in the previous chapters. While drawing lessons from other jurisdictions, it 
examines the extent to which proposed bills and regulations address these challenges. 
Chapter five concludes and makes suggestions for rem in light of the study’s findings. 




2.  CHAPTER TWO: INADEQUACIES IN THE LEGAL PROVISIONS  
This chapter examines the formulation of the core elem nts of the offence of insider 
trading and makes use of Kenyan cases to analyse how t ese inadequacies present a 
challenge to the prosecution of this offence. It isan investigation of the inadequacies in the 
legal provisions on insider trading. Thus, the research in this section contributes to the 
overall study by examining whether the text of the law on insider trading in Kenya creates 
an environment in which the ideal of market efficiency can be experienced through the 
effective prohibition of insider trading. 
As discussed previously, the Capital Markets Act prohibits an insider from trading while in 
possession of information which is non-public and price-sensitive.66 On this basis, the 
elements of the insider trading offense can be summarised as the dealing in securities by a 
person who is an insider; who possesses certain information; the information is non-public; 
and the information is also price-sensitive. Considering that insider trading is a criminal 
offence under the Act, the prosecution is expected to prove these elements beyond 
reasonable doubt in order to secure a conviction for the offence.  
As stated in the previous chapter, this study will give emphasis to the application of the 
provisions of the Capital Markets Act in the country’s first trials for insider trading, since 
these cases demonstrate weaknesses in the application of existing law. The trials involving 
Mr. Bernard Kibaru and Terence Davidson arose from alleged insider trading involving the 
shares of a retail supermarket chain, Uchumi Limited, which is a public limited company 
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incorporated in 1975 under the Companies Act.67 The cases evolved from similar set of 
facts and could actually be considered as one. 
In brief, the facts are that Mr. Terrence Davidson who was the Chief Executive Officer of 
Kenya Commercial Bank, Uchumi’s bankers, was accused of being privy to information 
on the financial status of the company when he instructed his stockbroker to sell Uchumi 
Limited shares just a few days before the retail supermarket chain collapsed.68  
A similar allegation was made against Mr. Bernard Kibaru, who at the time was a senior 
executive at Uchumi and who disposed of his shares in the company just a few days before 
it collapsed.69 In its judgement, the court found for the defendants, highlighting that the 
company’s information memorandum clearly showed that t e company was making losses 
and was technically insolvent and the losses were a fact known to the public. The alleged 





                                                           
67 Chapter 486 of the Laws of Kenya. See <www.uchumi.com>: In early 2000s Uchumi started to experience 
financial and operational difficulties occasioned by a sub-optimal expansion strategy coupled with weak 
internal control systems. This resulted in a marked dwindling of the Company’s resources which  culminated 
in its inability to meet its obligations on an ongoing basis. Initial restructuring of Uchumi did not f restall the 
deteriorating performance of the Company. Eventually, in May 2006, the Board of Directors resolved that 
the Company ceases operations and in June 2006, the Company was placed under receivership. 
Simultaneously, the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) suspended the Company’s listing on the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange (NSE). The company’s receivership was however lifted in 2010 after an upward turn of 
affairs and the company was successfully re-listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange in May 2011.   
68 Republic versus Terrence Davidson, Nairobi CMCC 1338 of 2008. 
69 Republic versus Bernard Mwangi Kibaru, Nairobi CMCC 1337 of 2008. 
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While making reference to these cases, it will be demonstrated that the concept of inside 
information is plagued with vagueness and ambiguity and that conceptual difficulties arise 
in determining what information is non-public and price-sensitive. It will also be 
established that there are no objective criteria which determine publication of information 
as well as how information can be possessed by a corporate entity. Cumulatively, these 
factors raise evidentiary difficulties for the prosecution of the offense and enable accused 
persons to utilise the existing loopholes to obtain acquittals.  
2.1. Ambiguity in the Meaning of Inside Information 
The Capital Markets Act prohibits insider trading i Kenya.70 The Act further prohibits the 
use of unpublished price-sensitive information and proscribes the dealing in securities by 
insiders on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive nformation.71 Moreover, an insider is 
prohibited from communicating such information or counselling or procuring others to 
deal in securities on the basis of this information.72  As a consequence, the Act discourages 
conduct that may facilitate the practice of insider trading and any activities related to it. 
The definition of an insider is provided in the Capit l Markets Act as follows:   
“Any person who is or was connected with a company, or is deemed to have been 
connected with a company and who is reasonably expected to have access, by 
virtue of such connection, to unpublished information which, if made generally 
available, would be likely to materially affect the price or value of the securities of 
                                                           
70 Section 33 of the Act is the operative provision in so far as prohibition of insider trading is concer ed. This 
section embodies the general rule, defences and prescrib s harsh criminal sanctions for offenders. It 
identifies the persons who must not deal in securities by virtue of their connection with a body corporate in 
the preceding six months. 
71 The Capital Markets Act in section 32A prohibits the use of unpublished price-sensitive information. 
72 Capital Markets Act s 33 (4). 
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the company, or who has received or has had access to uch unpublished 
information.”73 
From this definition, it is observable that the conept of information is central to the 
prohibition of insider trading. An offence will only be committed when a person has inside 
information which is used to deal in securities. It is, therefore, surprising that the Act does 
not give guidance with regard to the meaning of ‘information’. The term is susceptible to a 
number of interpretations. It is a term that is used in a vacuous and broad manner, thereby 
begging the question, what exactly is meant by the term ‘information’ under the Capital 
Markets Act?  
The literal interpretation of this term information would be open to include material that 
could vary from the contents of a prospectus all the way through to rumours and even 
speculations. This possibility for open interpretation would easily accord a defence to 
insider traders if they were to claim that they trans cted their trade based on insider 
information which was already available in the market in the form of speculation. 
The evidence of this ambiguity is demonstrated by the case of The Republic versus 
Bernard Mwangi Kibaru in which the accused was charged with the offence of insider 
trading.74 The prosecution alleged that that the accused was prompted to sell shares on the 
basis of information he had obtained by virtue of his position in Uchumi Supermarkets. 
This information, that the company was performing poorly and that it continued to make 
losses, was allegedly not generally available to the public. In order to prove its case, the 
prosecution called six witnesses. They testified that before the accused sold his shares, he 
was the head of the buying and merchandising department and had been attending the 
                                                           
73 Capital Markets Act s 2. See also s 32A and s 33. 
74 Republic versus Bernard Mwangi Kibaru, Nairobi CMCC 1337 of 2008.  
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Uchumi board of directors meeting where the poor performance of the company was 
discussed. The accused was subsequently put on his defence and the defence demonstrated 
that Uchumi’s poor performance and the pulling out f i s major shareholders was a matter 
that had been publicized in the newspapers.  
The court outlined the issue for determination as whether or not the accused by virtue of 
his position as an employee of Uchumi Supermarkets had obtained, in the course of his 
employment, information which was generally unavailable to the public and which 
information he exploited in selling his shares in the company. Eventually, the accused was 
acquitted on the ground that he had based the sale of his shares on information that had 
been publicized in the newspapers. 
The significance of this case is that for purposes of determining whether information is in 
the public domain, a newspaper report is deemed acceptable as information. A 
fundamental objection to this view is that a newspaper report could range from an official 
corporate advertisement, to a criticism by a competing corporate entity, to a tabloid article 
replete with the latest gossip or even to a well-researched article from a credible source. 
Whereas all these are probable contents of newspaper articles, they are not of equal 
reliability and credibility. 
The problems of proof arising from the broad and vacuous meaning of the term 
information are exacerbated by the need to establish thi  information as the basis for the 
prohibited transaction. This requirement is reflected in section 32A of the Act which 
makes reference to insider trading as trading on the ‘basis’ of unpublished insider 
information. It is arguable that the basis of an individual’s decision is a mental element, 
which can only be known to the transacting party. As such, an external party may never 
really be in a position to determine such a basis unless it is expressed orally or in writing 
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by the decision-maker. Indeed, the mere existence of inf rmation in the public domain 
does not necessarily mean that trade was conducted on the basis of this public information. 
Thus, unless there is a confession, it would appear th t the prosecution may find it 
impossible to secure a conviction under section 32Aof the Act.  
From the foregoing, it should be sufficient for the prosecution to demonstrate the mere 
possession or knowledge of non-public information by an insider at the time of the 
offending transaction in order to ground liability. In order to secure convictions, there 
would be need for an amendment of section 32A, to replace dealing in securities ‘on the 
basis of ’ with ‘while in the possession of’ or ‘knowledge of ’ of non-public information. 
This is instead of the existing requirement that the prosecution must establish the basis of 
the insider’s decision to trade; which, as seen above, is virtually impossible. Such an 
amendment would also motivate the prompt disclosure of material information by insiders 
and corporations.75 
A final point in relation to insider information isthat the definition of an insider in section 
33 implies a person-connection; meaning that what makes a person an insider is not their 
connection to information but their connection to the company. It creates a causal link 
between employment in a body corporate and acquisition of information.76 Under this 
approach, the prosecution would need to prove that the accused had been an insider, and 
further, that information obtained in their condition as insider was the basis of the 
transaction in question. This creates an even more onerous burden the prosecution to 
discharge. 
                                                           
75 South African Securities Services Act in sections 73 and 77 merely requires knowledge as a prerequisite 
for liability. It does not require that the defendat be shown to have deliberately exploited the inside 
information. 
76 Capital Markets Act s 33(11). 
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Illustrative of this is the case of The Republic versus Bernard Mwangi Kibaru where the 
prosecution had to prove the ‘person-connection’ and did this by demonstrating that before 
Kibaru sold his shares, he was the head of the buying and merchandising department and 
had been attending the Uchumi board of directors meeting where the poor performance of 
the company had been discussed.  
 It is noticeable that this link between employment in a body corporate and acquisition of 
information bears the underlying assumption that price-sensitive information is acquired 
only in the course of employment. Thus, the consideration that information was obtained 
when “it was not in the ordinary course of business” could avail an acceptable defence 
under the Capital Markets Act. Again, such an approach begs several unanswered 
questions: What is the ordinary course of business? Is this limited to the ordinary hours of 
work? Is this limited to communication between persons who have dealings resulting from 
work-related relationships? Are there situations which could be considered borderline, for 
instance information exchanged over a social evening drink by colleagues? The 
uncertainty created by these questions that are not deal  with in the law could be used by 
the defence to show that information was not obtained i  the ordinary course of business 
and as such provide a loophole to escape liability.  
2.2. Lack of Clarity in the Determination of Material Pr ice-Sensitive Information 
 Price-sensitive information generally means any information that relates directly or 
indirectly to a listed company and which if published, is likely to materially affect the 
price of securities of such company. 
This information that is unknown to the public may be used by a person who wants to buy 
securities at their current price before the information becomes public and causes prices to 
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rise. For example, an insider with information about a potential merger by can gain 
advantage by buying shares in the company before the news of the merger becomes public, 
which would ordinarily result in the share price of the company increasing. A person who 
has the information and wants to sell securities at their current price before the information 
becomes public and causes prices to fall could likewis  use such information. An example 
is a director selling shares in his company before negative news about the company 
reaches the public domain, after which the price of such shares usually declines.  
Although insiders are still free to participate in the financial markets, the transactions they 
engage in are limited to those for which the information has no price implications or for 
which the information is public since a total ban on trading by insiders would constitute an 
unjustifiable limitation to their freedom of economic activity. This is also the case in 
developed markets where insider trading prohibitions have undergone careful definition 
and judicial interpretation.77 It is noteworthy that the Capital Markets (Securities) (Public 
Offers, listing and Disclosure) Regulations 2002 defines material information as ‘any 
information that may affect the price of an issuer’s securities or influence investment 
decisions. The regulations thereafter provide a list of such information.’78 This definition 
and list is replicated in the Nairobi Securities Exchange Management and Membership 
rules.79   
It is therefore a matter of significance that whereas the Capital Markets Act in section 32A 
makes reference to ‘unpublished price sensitive information’ and prohibits the use of 
                                                           
77 S.M. Bainbridge ‘An Overview of Insider Trading Law and Policy: An Introduction to the Insider Trading 
Research Handbook’ [2012] No. 12-15 UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper Series 1-37, 3. < 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141457> Accessed on 30 October 2012. 
78 See Regulation 2. 
79 Nairobi Securities Exchange Website <http://www.nse co.ke/regulatory-framework/category/42-nairobi-
securities-exchange-nse.html > Accessed 21 0ctober 2011.
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unpublished insider information, arguments have been raised about vagueness in the use of 
either term. The Act makes use of the terms ‘unpublished price sensitive information’, and 
unpublished insider information interchangeably and again in section 33 expressly 
prohibits the use of price-sensitive information by persons connected to a body corporate.  
A brief review of the case of The Republic versus Terrence Davidson Alias Terry 
Davidson will help explain the challenges in prosecuting the offence of insider trading 
resulting from such ambiguity in the application of the terms publication and materiality of 
information.80   The accused in this case was charged with two counts and four alternative 
charges of insider trading.81 The prosecution’s position was that the accused was the Chief 
Executive Officer and the Managing Director of Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB).  KCB 
were the bankers of Uchumi Supermarkets Ltd and the main Uchumi transaction account 
was held at KCB where all sale proceeds were banked. The charges against the accused 
were premised on the contention that, as the Chief Ex cutive Officer of KCB, he was in a 
position to get price-sensitive information on Uchumi that was not generally available. It 
was alleged that this information was the basis upon which the accused sold his shares.  
The defence demonstrated that Uchumi’s poor performance and the pulling out of its major 
shareholders was a matter that had been publicized in the newspapers. In addition, the 
defence was of the view, and the court concurred, that financial information was not 
                                                           
80 Considering that Kenya relies on judicial precedent and these are decisions of the magistrates’ court, these 
judgments are not binding on other courts but are of persuasive value. A judgment by the High Court or 
Court of Appeal would have been preferable as it would set a precedent on insider trading case in Kenya. 
The judgments are however useful for this study as they provide a practical indication of how existing i sider 
trading provisions of law have generally been understood, interpreted and applied.  




material information as it was not included in the list provided in the Capital Markets 
(Securities) (Public Offers, Listing and Disclosure) Regulations 2002.  
In delivering its’ judgment, the court found that the information availed to KCB regarding 
Uchumi was financial in nature and that the financil improvement experienced by 
Uchumi immediately after the rights issue was what w s anticipated in the information 
memorandum of the rights issue that had been supplied to the public.  Further, Uchumi’s 
poor performance and the pulling out of its major shareholders was a matter that had been 
publicized in the newspapers and was, therefore, not u available to others. The accused 
was, therefore, acquitted on all charges. As a result of the ambiguous definition of material 
price-sensitive information, the issue in this case became one of interpretation; whether or 
not financial information is material or price-sensitive. 
Admittedly, it is important to have a clear definition or criteria to determine ‘publication’ 
and ‘material information’ in order to impose certain restrictions against the use of such 
privileged or insider information for personal benefit before such information becomes 
available to the public market. Given that the standard of proof in insider trading 
prosecutions is beyond reasonable doubt, like in all criminal matters, the absence of a clear 
definition or criteria creates a loophole through wich insider traders can escape liability. 
This applies especially when they begin to challenge the nature of the information 
involved and cast doubts as to its publication or materiality.  
This paper takes the approach that the decision of the court in The Republic versus 
Terrence Davidson, in finding that financial information is not material information, flies 
in the face of the rules of statutory interpretation. Indeed, according to the literal rule of 
interpretation, the words of a statute must be interpreted according to their ordinary, literal 
and grammatical sense as found in the dictionary. Notably, the Capital Markets 
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(Securities) (Public Offers, listing and Disclosure) Regulations 2002 defines material 
information as ‘any information that may affect the price of an issuer’s securities or 
influence investment decisions. The regulations thereafter provide a list of such 
information.’82  Using the literal rule of interpretation, the list provided in the regulations 
could not be deemed to be exhaustive especially becaus  the provision states that such 
material information “includes” the provided information.83 The mere fact that the 
financial information was not listed does not mean, s the court in its wisdom would like 
us to believe, that financial information is not material information. The final item on the 
list which reads “or any other peculiar circumstances that may prevail with respect to the 
issuer or the relevant industry” is further indicatve of the non-exhaustive nature of the list 
provided.  
Indeed, the ejusdem generis rule which applies to resolve the problem of giving meaning 
to groups of words where one of the words is ambiguous or inherently unclear is 
applicable here as well. On the whole, the rule state  that where "general words follow 
enumerations of particular classes or persons or things, the general words shall be 
construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or kind as 
those enumerated." 84 
                                                           
82 See Regulation 2. 
83 In the case of Fisher versus Bell [1961] 1 QB 394, the defendant, a shopkeeper, was pro ecuted for 
displaying an illegal flick-knife for sale. Because it is an offense to offer such an item for sale under the 
Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act (1951) he was convicted. On appeal, however, it was held that offer 
for sale has a technical meaning in law, and a shop window isplay is an Invitation to treat, not an offer in 
contractual terms. The conviction was therefore quashed. In 1961 a further Act was passed making it an 
offense to 'expose for the purpose of sale' an offensiv  weapon.  
84 In the case of Powell versus Kempton Park Race Course [1899], A.C 143, it was an offence to use a 
“house, office, room or other place for betting” and the defendant was operating from a place outdoors. The 
court held that “other place” had to refer to other indoor places because the words in the list were indoor 
places and so he was not guilty. 
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Applying the ejusdem generis rule, the final item on the list which reads “or any other 
peculiar circumstances that may prevail with respect to the issuer or the relevant industry” 
in the Capital Markets (Securities) (Public Offers, li ting and Disclosure) Regulations 
2002 ought, therefore, to be understood in a particular context.  It ought to be understood 
in the context of any information that may affect the price of an issuer’s securities or 
influence investment decisions. The foregoing arguments strongly support the position that 
financial information definitely falls within this wider bracket. 
2.3. Lack of Criteria to Define Publication of Informati on 
As alluded to in the foregoing discussion, publication is a critical factor in determining 
whether or not a transaction is prohibited. The reason behind this is that, unpublished 
insider information may be utilised by a person who wants to buy securities at their current 
price before the information becomes public and causes prices to rise. On the other hand, 
the information could be used by a person who wants to sell securities at their current price 
before the information becomes public and causes prices to fall could likewise use it.  
It is therefore important to note that the Capital M rkets Act is silent on when information 
can properly be said to have been published. To a gre t extent, this is an omission whose 
consequences to the prosecution process should not be underestimated. 
The impact of uncertainty in the meaning of public information is illustrated in the case of 
The Republic versus Terrence Davidson whose facts have been described above.85 As 
discussed, the defence in that case ably demonstrated that Uchumi’s poor performance was 
a matter that had been publicised in the newspapers. It is noteworthy that the decision by 
KCB to stop financing Uchumi was not public, and was known to Davidson on account of 
                                                           
85 Republic versus Terrence Davidson, Nairobi CMCC 1338 of 2008. 
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his position at the Bank. However, Davidson’s trading despite his precise knowledge about 
Uchumi’s true financial situation was not sufficient to sustain a conviction just because it 
was shown that there was public knowledge about Uchumi’s general poor financial 
position.  
Thus, whereas it was publicised in the newspapers that Uchumi was generally performing 
poorly, the decision by KCB to stop financing Uchumi was not known to the public. The 
ruling in this case seems to suggest that the position in Kenya with respect to publication 
of information is that information that is partially non-public is still considered public 
information. It matters not that only some and not all information is not in the public 
domain; and so long as only some of the information is in the public domain then the 
information is concluded to be in the public domain nd any trade conducted on the basis 
of such information will not qualify as insider trading. 
This case further provokes pertinent questions as follows: Is mere publication in 
newspapers sufficient publication? Should this publication take a specific form?  
As was noted in the case of The Republic versus Bernard Mwangi Kibaru, the accused was 
acquitted on the ground that he had based the sale of his shares on information that had 
been publicized in the newspapers. This ruling seem to suggest that for purposes of 
determining whether information is in the public domain, a newspaper article suffices as 
publication of information.  
It is noteworthy that objections could be raised to this view because newspapers vary in 
terms of content, reliability, credibility among other differences.  In addition, the 
information could be published by the issuing company or even speculators in which case 
55 
 
reliability would vary depending on the source of the article. It may, therefore, not be 
entirely sufficient to term all newspaper articles as publication. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that there are no objective criteria with which to 
determine when information can be said to have been published. As demonstrated above, 
this becomes a problem of proof for the prosecution and a loophole that can be explored by 
accused persons to obtain acquittals.  
2.4. Difficulties in Assessing Possession of Information by Corporate Bodies 
An examination of the Capital Markets Act indicates that Section 33 is the operative 
provision in so far as prohibition of insider trading is concerned. It identifies the persons 
who must not deal in securities by virtue of their connection with a body corporate in the 
preceding six months. These include an officer of that body corporate or of a related body 
corporate, a director, secretary, executive officer, or employee, receiver, receiver manager, 
official manager or his deputy, or a trustee of the body corporate.86 The person could also 
be a substantial shareholder in that body corporate or in a related body corporate; or 
occupies a position that may reasonably be expected to give him access to information.  
The definition of an insider in the Act envisages a natural person as well as a juristic 
person in the form of a corporate entity.87 This is evidenced by the existence in the Capital 
Markets Act of penalties for insider trading for natur l persons as well as for companies. 
Again, sanctions for contravening the Act include fines for corporate bodies and a fine 
and/or imprisonment for natural persons.88 In addition, the Act makes reference to 
                                                           
86 Capital Markets Act s 33 (9). 
87 Capital Markets Act s 33. 
88 Capital Markets Act s 33 (12). 
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defences that corporate entities may rely on. These d f nces are set out in section 33(5b), 
section 33(7) and section 33(8) of the Capital Markets Act and are listed below. 
The first provision is section 33(5)(b) which precludes a bearer of insider information from 
communicating that information if he knows or has reason to believe that the other person 
will make use of the information to deal in or procure another person to deal in those 
securities. This avails a defence where the insider can demonstrate that they did not know 
or have reason to believe the other person will make use of the information to deal in the 
securities. The second provision is section 33(7), which enables a body corporate to enter 
into transactions at any time even if one of its officers is in possession of insider 
information so long as the decision to transact wasentered by another person other than 
the officer; there were arrangements to ensure that insider advise or information was not 
communicated and that indeed the insider advise or inf mation was not communicated. 
The third provision is section 33(8) which allows bodies corporate to trade in securities of 
other bodies corporate based on insider information. This is in instances where the 
information is obtained in the course of duty at their own body corporate relating to 
proposed dealing by their body corporate in the securities of the other body corporate. 
The Capital Markets Act defines an insider as follows: 
“Any person who is or was connected with a company, or is deemed to have been 
connected with a company and who is reasonably expected to have access, by 
virtue of such connection, to unpublished information which, if made generally 
available, would be likely to materially affect the price or value of the securities of 
the company, or who has received or has had access to uch unpublished 
information.”89 
                                                           
89 Capital Markets Act s 2. See also section 32A and 33. 
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This definition could be applied to investment banks as well as their employees, 
underwriters, financial analysts, lawyers as well as persons who come across insider 
information in a casual or fortuitous manner from persons connected to companies.  
The foregoing discussion and definition raises a number of salient questions that are not 
covered by the Act. When then, does a corporate body ecome an insider trader? How 
does a corporate possess information? How does the requirement for knowledge in section 
33(5) (b) apply to corporate bodies? 
A corporate body can become an insider because it i possible for bodies corporate to trade 
in securities of other bodies corporate. This becomes insider trading when the transaction 
is based on insider information.  In instances where the information has been obtained in 
the course of duty at their own body corporate relating to proposed dealing by their body 
corporate in the securities of the other body corporate, the Act provides a defence to the 
offence of insider trading.90 
With regard to possession of information, a primary nd superficial approach would be the 
physical possession of information in the form of physical files, computers, and flash disks 
etcetera by a corporate body. 
Information may also be possessed in a non-tangible sense by individuals within the body 
corporate because they know or are aware of the information. Because the Act does not 
state how a body corporate possesses information, inferences would have to be drawn from 
the law of agency and the Companies Act.91 
                                                           
90 Capital Markets Act s 33(8). 
91 The Companies Act, Chapter 486 of the Laws of Kenya.  
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Corporate entities are run by natural persons, usually those who make up the board of 
directors. Since the board is responsible for the day-to-day management of a company, it 
would, therefore, have to be inferred that where information is possessed by a majority of 
the board or in the alternative by the directing mind and will of the corporate, then that 
corporate is deemed to possess the information. Under the law of agency too, a company 
can be said to possess information where the information is in the possession of the 
company’s agents who have authority to receive information on the company’s behalf. 
Several inferences that have to be drawn above may well be an indicator that the insider 
trading law with regard to corporate entities is not sufficiently laid down in the Act and 
may become evidentiary hurdles during prosecution. 
To sum up, whereas the Act foresees insiders as natural persons as well juristic persons, its 
focus lies more on natural persons. Thus, it fails to provide for juristic persons, such as 
corporate entities, and how they can be considered as insiders. 
2.5. Gaps in Information Disclosure Requirements 
The Capital Markets Act obliges all companies that offer securities for sale to the public to 
publish an information memorandum in compliance with requirements prescribed by the 
authority.92 These disclosure requirements are to be fulfilled b fore an issuer is permitted 
to distribute its securities through the stock exchange.  A further requirement is the 
continual disclosure of developments which may lead to substantial movement in the price 
of its securities.93 This is because with the passage of time from the initial prospectus 
distribution, the disclosure contained in the prospectus becomes of decreasing 
                                                           
92 See also, Capital Market Listing and Disclosure Regulations 2002. 




informational value to the investor. The issuer will need to provide more relevant and 
current information as long as securities continue to be available for sale in the public 
market. These initial and continual disclosure requirements are binding to the issuing 
companies and not to insiders generally or to directo s specifically. 
Mandatory disclosure requirement for insiders are a gulatory feature which ensure that 
transactions by insiders are a matter of public record. These have the effect of deterring 
insiders from dealing in non-public material information. Of equal importance is the 
affirmative duty of disclosure for companies or institutions that come into possession of 
material, price-sensitive information. Such a duty of mandatory reporting and timely 
disclosure would eliminate the very existence of materi l non-public information. It would 
also enhance market efficiency as it would enlarge the pool of information from which 
market analysts can draw in the performance of their asks resulting in accurate pricing of 
investment instruments. Such disclosure is relied upon heavily by regulators in most 
developed markets.94 This is because it ensures that market participants have equal access 
to information which will affect market price. 
As indicated in the literature review, the present study seeks to analyse Kenya’s 
formulation of the legal provisions on insider trading and in that process assess the 
relevance and applicability of mandatory disclosure to Kenya’s markets. It was also stated 
that this study will assess the adequacy of provisins on disclosure in Kenya. In light of 
this, an examination of the Capital Markets Act reveals that the duty to disclose is limited 
                                                           
94 K. Langenbucher, ‘The ‘Use or Possession’ Debate Revisit d—Spector Photo Group and Insider Trading 
in Europe’ [2010] 5 (16) Capital Markets Law Journal 452-470, 463. < http://cmlj.oxfordjournals.org/ > 




to the company directors and the issuing company or institution. It fails to extend to 
insiders generally.  
Admittedly, this is a significant gap since the extension of such provisions to insiders 
generally would have the effect of deterring insiders from exploiting material non-public 
information in their possession or even requiring isiders with information to abstain from 
trading. It would ensure that trade by insiders is placed on the public record and would 
therefore promote market efficiency by ensuring that prices reflect non-public information 
as well.  
Further, there is no denying that the prosecution wuld have a lighter and less complicated 
task in proving the breach of disclosure requirements as compared to proving the breach of 
the existing insider trading rules. All things considered then, these benefits would be lost 
on our market if our legislation were to remain as it i . 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that inadequacies in the provisions of existing law and its 
enforcement can be identified from the application of the law and existing literature to the 
two insider trading cases that have been prosecuted in Kenya. These include lack of clarity 
in the meaning and application of core elements of the crime of insider trading such as 
insider information, publication of information and material information in the Act. It has 
also been shown that the absence of mandatory disclosure requirements for insiders places 
the duty of curbing insider trading solely on the market regulator. Effectively, the problem 
in the Kenyan context appears to be inadequacies in the drafting of the statute coupled with 
narrow interpretation of existing laws; these render it well-nigh impossible to prove the 
crime of insider trading beyond reasonable doubt and e ables insider traders escape the 
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law by casting doubts in the prosecution case. It is, herefore, evident that the prohibition 






3. CHAPTER THREE: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the research and analysis of shortcomings of the Capital Markets 
Act as experienced by legal practitioners in Kenya as well as their views on the proposals 
for reform. It begins with a discussion of the methodology adopted in carrying out the 
study. This includes the research design, target population of the study, sample and 
sampling techniques, description of data collection and analysis tools. It then discusses 
the findings and draws conclusions.  
The research under this chapter contributes to the overall study by providing a mirror 
against which actual practices can be reflected to test the hypothesis  that the provisions in 
the Capital Markets Act relating to insider trading are vaguely formulated and are therefore 
difficult to prove, thus hindering the effective prosecution of the offence of insider trading. 
3.1. Research Design: Population of the Study and Sampling Procedure 
The research design was an exploratory survey which was adopted in order to reach an in-
depth understanding of the experiences of legal practitioners. This involved gathering data 
that would provide a description of views and experiences of persons who apply the 
Capital Markets Act and more specifically, those provisions that deal with insider trading. 
The survey questionnaire was uploaded on cyberspace and the link distributed to key 
informants in order to obtain primary data on the application and enforcement of existing 
legal provisions on insider trading.95 
The study population constituted legal practitioners in law firms in Nairobi, those in the 
Capital Markets Authority, the Nairobi Securities Exchange, in-house counsel and 
                                                           
95 < http/law-research.org > as at May 2012. 
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academia. The study population was limited to Nairobi firms mainly because practise in 
this area is concentrated in the capital. 
The sample was purposive, with informants being purposively selected from the Capital 
Markets Authority, the Nairobi Securities Exchange and legal practitioners in specific law 
firms in Nairobi that are known to engage in capital m rkets practice.  
The rationale for this purposive sampling was develop d when the research instrument was 
pre-tested on a variety of legal practitioners attending the Law Society of Kenya Annual 
General Meeting. A majority of the lawyers were of the view that the Capital Markets Act 
and the law on insider trading is specialised area of law.96 They suggested that the 
questionnaire should be administered only to specific lawyers and firms that dealt with 
capital markets, since this is not a generalised ara of legal practice. 
The lawyers making up the research population were, therefore, identified through the law 
firms listed as practising in the Capital Markets field in commonly used independent sites 
that have international ranking system for law firms. The main one used in this study was 
the IFLR 1000 web listings for sourcing legal counsel. These were supplemented with the 
listing of lawyers in the Capital Markets field in HG.org Legal Directories as well as 
Chambers Global, an international legal research company.  
The Survey Instrument 
The survey instrument used was a semi-structured questionnaire comprising nine (9) 
questions. The questions were designed to elicit data in accordance with the research 
question.97 The possible survey responses were presented in a likert chart, a psychometric 
                                                           
96 The Law Society of Kenya Annual General Meeting was held on 26th March 2011 at the Intercontinental 
Hotel. 
97 See Appendix 3: Survey Questionnaire. 
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scale commonly involved in research that employs questionnaires. It is the most widely 
used approach to scaling responses in survey research.98 
The questionnaire was uploaded on cyberspace and administered by the researcher via 
email and the possibility was opened up for follow-up interviews with key informants at 
the Capital Markets Authority and legal practitioners in law firms in order to obtain 
primary data on the application and enforcement of existing legal provisions on insider 
trading. 
Validity and Reliability  
The reliability of a research instrument concerns the extent to which the instrument yields 
the same results on repeated trial, while validity etermines whether the research truly 
measures that which it was intended to measure or how truthful the results are.  
The researcher tried as much as possible to maximise the reliability and validity of data she 
collected by ensuring data collection techniques yilded relevant and correct information. 
The techniques to ensure this included triangulation and pre-test/pilot study. The 
researcher applied the triangulation method by combining the doctrinal approach as well as 
making use of questionnaires to complement the doctrinal approach.  
For reliability, the researcher carried out a pilot study where she pre-tested the instrument 
before using it. This was in order to check for vocabulary, language level and how well the 
questions were understood. The researcher also refrain d from asking leading questions. 
The information obtained from pre-testing of the instrument was used to revise the 
questionnaire and gauge whether questions met the objectives of the study. 
                                                           
98 Research Methods Knowledge Base Website < http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/scallik.php> 




An application for research permit was made at the National Council for Science and 
Technology and the permit obtained.99 The permit was obtained during the preparation of 
the doctrinal section of the paper and it expired before data collection stage. It was 
renewed upon expiry.100 An assurance was given to the subjects that any data or 
information collected would be treated in the strictest confidence, and would not be 
directly referenced in oral or written reports.  Privacy was assured by the use of emails 
directed specifically at the subjects. There were no meetings, observers or listeners.   
Challenges Encountered In the Survey 
Due to an apparent lack of time there was a noticeable disinclination on the part of 
respondents towards survey questionnaires. The researcher had to send reminders by email 
and phone call before the survey questionnaires were duly completed. Some respondents 
promised to revert but failed to do so even after being reminded. Thus the data collection 
was conducted over a three month period, and even th , not all the identified subjects 
responded to the survey. Some of the respondents experi nced internet down-time and 
were only able to complete the questionnaire after several attempts. 
3.2. Results of the Survey 
The questionnaires were completed online and the data stored in the database. After 
collection, the data was reviewed for inconsistencis. It was then organised and analysed. 
The survey questionnaire themes were divided and analysed in relation to the main 
research themes as follows: 
                                                           
99 See Appendix 1. 
100 See Appendix 2. 
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Introduction: Personal Information and Approach to Insider Trading Legislation 
The introductory section of the study sought to establish the respondent’s occupation and 
the years of experience they had in engaging with capital markets law. It also sought to 
find out the respondent’s views on prohibition of insider trading and whether they thought 
this prohibition would enhance investor confidence in Kenya’s Capital Markets.  The 
purpose of these questions was to gauge the respondent’s level of experience as well as 
their approach in applying the Capital Markets Act.  
Table 1: Distribution of respondents by occupation 
Occupation Number of Respondents Percentage 
Law Firm 10 66.6% 
Securities Exchange 1 6.6% 
Capital Markets Authority 1 6.6% 
Academic 1 6.6% 
In-House Lawyer 2 13.3% 
 
In terms of occupational distribution, majority (66. %) of the respondents were based in 
law firms and 13.3% were in-house counsel. The remainder were from the Securities 
Exchange, the Capital Markets Authority and academia. Thus, data was obtained from a 





Table 2: Distribution of respondents by years of experience 
Years of experience Number of Respondents Percentage 
Below 2 years 2 13.3% 
Between 2-9years 10 66.6% 
10 years and above 3 20% 
 
Regarding experience, the overwhelming majority of respondents had considerable 
experience in capital markets law. Those with experience ranging from two to nine years 
comprised 66.6% of the sample. The respondents withover ten years of experience 
accounted for 20% of the sample. Those under 2 years of experience comprised only 13% 
of the sample. 
Table 3: Distribution of respondents by their approach to prohibition 
Approach Number of Respondents Percentage 
Insider Trading should be prohibited 15 100% 
Insider Trading should NOT be prohibited 0 0% 
 
The question on whether insider trading should or sh uld not be prohibited sought to test 
the acceptability of Prof Henry Manne’s argument defending insider trading. The 
argument is that insider trading enhances market efficiency by ensuring speedy availability 
of information into the market. 
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All the respondents had a common approach to the prohibition of insider trading. There 
was resounding agreement that insider trading should be prohibited. This approach was 
consistent with that of several works referred to in the literature review as well as the 
approach taken by legislative trends worldwide. 
Table 4: Distribution of respondents by opinion on investor confidence 
Opinion on investor confidence Respondents Percentage 
Effective prohibition of insider trading will promote 
investor confidence. 
14 93% 
Effective prohibition of insider trading will NOT promote 
investor confidence. 
1 7% 
According to data elicited in this survey, the overwhelming majority of respondents were 
of the view that effective prohibition of insider trading would indeed promote confidence 
of investors in Kenya’s capital markets. There was the odd 7% that did not agree with this 
opinion. 
Inside Information: The Term ‘Information’ Under Th e Act 
The study sought to find out the subject’s interpretation and understanding of the term 
information as used in the Act. The purpose of this question was to demonstrate the variety 
of ways in which the term information can generally be understood. The responses are 
represented in the graph overleaf. 
Majority of the respondents were in agreement that gut er-press, office rumours and 
tabloids could not be properly described as information. There was uncertainty about 
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whether corporate advertisements in newspapers and speculative television news reports 
could be considered as information.  
There was a notable strong agreement that both tales exchanged over an evening drink or a 
game of golf as well as news gathered from another company during an international 
conference was indeed information.  




The respondent’s views are an indicator the general perception of information varies and if 
they were placed on a continuum, corporate advertisements in newspapers would lie on the 
weaker end of the continuum while news gathered in an international conference would lie 
on the strongest end. The other accepted perceptions of information would then fall at 
various positions within the continuum.  
Materiality of Information  
Further, the study then sought to establish whether  subjects’ understanding of the 
material information corresponds to the definition provided in the Capital Markets 
regulations. The Capital Markets (Securities) (Public Offers, listing and Disclosure) 
Regulations 2002 defines material information as ‘any information that may affect the 
price of an issuer’s securities or influence investment decisions’ and provides a list of such 
information.101 This list, however, does not include financial information.   
The purpose of this question was therefore to gauge whether respondents viewed financial 
information as material. For the avoidance of doubt, financial information was unpackaged 
to read ‘information on assets and liabilities.’  
All the respondents were of the view that the various categories of information were 
indeed material. These were the acquisition or loss of a significant contract, information on 
assets and liabilities, a tender offer for another issuer’s securities, a significant new product 
or discovery and a call of securities for redemption. Only 8% thought the tender offer and 
loss of significant contract were material.  
 
                                                           
101 See Regulation 2. 
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The responses are represented in the graph below: 
Figure 3: Materiality of Information 
 
There was consensus that information on assets and liabilities was material information. It 
seems clear from this evidence that financial information is generally understood to be 
material information. As anticipated, this position contrasts with the view of the court in 
Republic versus Terrence Davidson.102 
                                                           
102  See Nairobi CMCC 1338 of 2008. 
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The Understanding of Prompt Disclosure  
With regard to publication of information, the study sought to find out what the subjects 
considered as prompt disclosure. The purpose of this question was to find out how much 
the subjects appreciated the need for disclosure of information.  
The overwhelming majority (54%) recommended disclosure of price-sensitive information 
within 24 hours. Those who recommended disclosure as soon as the information was 
received accounted for 38% of the respondents. Only 8% proposed disclosure of 
information within 48 hours. These responses confirm that the requirement of prompt 
disclosure of information is generally considered an important aspect of securities law. 
General Assessment of Enforcement of the Act 
Under the theme enforcement, the study sought to find out the subjects’ view or experience 
on the factors that cause low enforcement of legal provisions. It also required them to rate 
the performance of the Capital Markets Authority in enforcing the law. The purpose of this 
question was to demonstrate public perceptions regarding levels of enforcement of the 
Capital Markets Act by the regulatory body. 
According to the data elicited in the survey, 85% of the respondents consider the capital 
markets legislation as having been drafted in a wayth t makes enforcement impossible. 
Those who regarded the standard of proof as being too high comprised 15% of the 
respondents. Majority of (46%) the respondents indicate a ‘low’ rate when it comes to the 
Capital Market Authority’s desire and enthusiasm to enforce the law. They also received a 
low rating for expertise to enforce the law. 
The vast majority of respondents showed little confidence in the adequacy of insider 
trading law. Almost half faulted the regulator’s desir , enthusiasm and expertise in 
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enforcing the law. The criticism accorded to the law was however, greater than that 
apportioned to the market regulator. 
3.3. Discussion 
This discussion is centred on the main issues arising in the research paper. These are the 
problem of ambiguity of the term information; the meaning of materiality of information; 
the meaning of publication of information; difficulties arising out of the possession of 
information by corporate bodies and the disclosure of information. They are discussed in 
light of the two objectives of this research which were to examine the inadequacies of the 
Capital Markets Act in addressing the elements of the offence of insider trading and to 
determine whether legal reforms are needed in order to curb insider trading and to promote 
a fair and efficient capital market.   
The study commenced with a review of literature which presented a debate on whether or 
not insider trading should be prohibited.103 Guided by the reality that all major economies 
have legislations prohibiting insider trading, this paper consistently took the position that 
insider trading ought to be prohibited. Further support for the prohibition of insider trading 
is now provided by overwhelming evidence from respondents. The prohibition is 
supported because respondents consider that it would promote confidence of investors in 
the capital markets. This response suggests that debates and academic theories should be 
tested in light of realities in the capital market. 
The first issue under discussion is the problem of ambiguity of the term information. 
According to the respondents, corporate advertisements in the newspapers, speculative 
                                                           
103  S. M. Bainbridge, ‘An Overview of Insider Trading Law and Policy: An Introduction to the Insider 
Trading Research Handbook’ [2012] No. 12-15 UCLA School of Law, Law-EconResearch Paper Series 1-
37, 24-34. < SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141457> Accessed on 30 October 2012. 
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news reports, tales exchanged over an evening drink or game of golf as well as news 
gathered in an international conference are all considered information. However, gutter 
press, office rumours and tabloids should not be termed as information. This position 
qualifies previous arguments in this study, which placed all these in one bundle as 
information. The finding, however, corroborates theargument that the term information is 
not specific and can be understood in many different ways. As previously noted, 
‘information’ is a term that is used in a vacuous and broad manner in the Capital Markets 
Act. It is therefore suggested that information should be statutorily defined for the 
avoidance of doubt. 
The problems of proof arising from this broad usage of the term information are 
exacerbated by the Act’s requirement to establish this information as the basis for the 
prohibited transaction.104 Further, the causal link established between employment in a 
body corporate and acquisition of information present  the assumption that price-sensitive 
information is acquired only in the course of employment.105 This avails the defence that 
information was obtained when “it was not in the ordinary course of business” and the 
debate about what the ordinary course of business means. It is proposed that the mere 
possession of inside information during the conduct of transactions should suffice to 
ground liability, as opposed to the requirement to establish the information as the basis of 
the trade. Further, the consideration that information is inside information when it was 
‘obtained in the ordinary course of business’ should also be eliminated. 
The definition of insider trading in the proposed lgislation, presents a shift from a person-
connection, to an information-connection which automatically reduces the market 
                                                           
104 Capital Markets Act s 32 A. 
105 Capital Markets Act s 33(11). 
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regulator’s burden from proving both that a person is an insider and that the person dealt 
with prohibited information to proving only that a person dealt with prohibited 
information.  
In addition, three criteria which information must meet in order to qualify as inside 
information is proposed. First, it must relate to particular securities or a particular issuer of 
securities as opposed to securities generally or issuer  of securities generally. Second, the 
information has not been made public and third, if it were made public, it would have a 
material effect on the price of any securities. Thus, the problem of vagueness would be 
eradicated in this manner. 
There is a need to eliminate reference to trading o the ‘basis’ of unpublished insider 
information, in order to relieve the market regulator of the burden of proving this mental 
element. There is further need to disregard the assumption that price-sensitive information 
is only acquired in the course of employment and thereby remove the defence currently 
available under the Capital Markets Act that information was obtained when “it was not in 
the ordinary course of business.”  
The second issue under discussion is with regard to materiality of information. This paper 
took the approach that the decision of the court in The Republic versus Terrence Davidson, 
in finding that financial information is not material information was erroneous. This 
position is supported by the literal rule of interpretation which stipulates that the words of 
a statute must be interpreted according to their ordina y, literal and grammatical sense. It 
was also stated earlier in this work that applying the literal rule of interpretation, the list 
provided in the regulations could not be deemed to be exhaustive especially because the 
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provision states that such material information “includes” the provided information.106 
Consequently, the fact that the financial information was not on the list ought not to have 
been interpreted as excluding financial information fr m the scope of material information. 
It now seems clear from the evidence, from the survey on materiality of information, that 
market practitioners consider financial information as material. An implication of this is 
the acknowledgment that that there are indeed problems of interpretation of the existing 
law. Judicial interpretation has read the word materi l information so narrowly as to 
exclude financial information therefore providing a means of escaping liability and is 
contrary to the spirit of the legislation. A broader interpretation is therefore proposed. 
The third issue was on publication of information. I  this regard it was indicated in the 
previous chapters that the Capital Markets Act does not provide objective criteria with 
which to determine when information can be said to have been published.  This becomes a 
problem of proof for the prosecution and a loophole that can be explored by accused 
persons to obtain acquittals. It was noted that the proposed law provides an insight into the 
meaning of information being ‘made public’.107 It is proposed that guidelines be 
established to assist the industry in dealing with the problem of determining when 
information can properly be said to have been published. 
The fourth issue under discussion is on the possession of information by corporate bodies. 
Whereas the Act foresees insiders as natural persons as well as juristic persons, its focus 
lies on natural persons. It therefore fails to provide for legal persons such as corporate 
                                                           
106 In the case of Fisher versus Bell [1961] 1 QB 394, the defendant, a shopkeeper, was pro ecuted for 
displaying an illegal flick-knife for sale. Because it is an offense to offer such an item for sale under the 
Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act (1951) he was convicted. On appeal, however, it was held that offer 
for sale has a technical meaning in law, and a shop window isplay is an Invitation to treat, not an offer in 
contractual terms. The conviction was therefore quashed. In 1961 a further Act was passed making it an 
offense to 'expose for the purpose of sale' an offensiv  weapon.  
107 Securities Industry Bill 2011 s 86. 
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entities and how they can be considered as insiders. As such, the existing law on 
corporations as insider traders remains largely untested and neither do the proposed laws 
tackle this aspect of insider trading. It is suggested that the gap in determining how 
corporations can be considered insiders and how they can be considered to have 
knowledge or possession of information still needs to be bridged. 
The fifth and final issue is on disclosure of information. The importance of disclosure as a 
foundation for promoting investor confidence in thecapital markets is underscored by the 
results of the survey as well as literature and arguments raised in the study. This reverses 
the onus of proof so that the accused would be requir d to prove his compliance with the 
disclosure requirements. It has been observed that t e Capital Markets Act lacks 
mandatory disclosure requirements for the reporting of transactions by insiders. It likewise 
fails to create an affirmative duty of disclosure for companies or institutions that come into 
possession of material price-sensitive information. 
The obligation to disclose material changes or new d velopments which are not in the 
public knowledge and which are necessary for the financial appraisal of the issuer should 
be strengthened. The regulations should also impose a duty on insiders to promptly 
disclose their interests in securities of an issuer. In the revision of the legal provisions, it is 
proposed that the affirmative duty of prompt discloure for companies and the reporting of 
transactions by insiders should be stated in clear and unambiguous terms. 
From the foregoing, it can be surmised that there is overwhelming evidence that the 
provisions on insider trading in the capital markets legislation are weak and this 
contributes to poor enforcement of the law. The enforcement process should be improved 
through adequately resourcing and staffing the market regulator to conduct prosecutions. 
Further, the proscribing of a variety of activities which serve to facilitate the practice of 
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insider trading is likely to make the combat of insider trading more effective.108 Such 
activities include market manipulation; false trading and market rigging transactions; 
fraudulently inducing trading in securities; use of manipulative or deceptive devices; and 
false or misleading statements inducing securities ransactions. An overhaul of the 
enforcement effort in relation to insider trading is therefore proposed.  If insider trading is 
to be curbed, it is necessary that the regulator is enthused and equipped to do so. There is 
also a need to widen the scope of prohibited conduct in order to incorporate market 
manipulation, use of manipulative devices, issuing of false statements and related activities 
that threaten integrity of the capital market. 
The Capital Markets Act has a criminal focus, which as discussed in this study, is difficult 
to traverse. These challenges in criminal prosecution of financial offences make a 
compelling case for an increased application of existing civil and administrative avenues, 
whose requirement of proof is on a balance of probabilities and therefore lower than 
criminal prosecution. 
The results of the study thus support the argument that the law as drafted is weak. Further, 
it is admitted that there are enforcement problems resulting from this weakness and these 
are complemented by an apparent poor desire and lack of enthusiasm by the market 
regulator to enforce the law. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This study has examined the elements of the offence of insider trading in the Capital 
Markets Act. The results of the survey indicate that there is great support for the 
prohibition of insider trading and that there are indeed inadequacies in the provisions on 
                                                           
108 E.Swan and J.Virgo, Market Abuse Regulation (Oxford University Press, London 2010) 6. 
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insider trading as presented in the Capital Markets Act. The current survey finds that the 
term information is perceived in different ways by practitioners and that financial 
information is indeed considered inside information. It also finds that there is need to 
impose a time-frame within which price-sensitive information should be made public. 
These results are consistent with the analysis of case law and comparative literature 
conducted in the previous chapters in which the elem nts of the offence of insider trading 
in the Capital Markets Act were analysed in light of existing case law to illustrate 
challenges to their enforcement. The study therefore concludes that the prohibition of 
insider trading as presently formulated is inadequate and almost impossible to prosecute 
effectively. This presents a compelling case for reform to ensure legal provisions that 
make up the elements of insider trading are clarified.  
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: ADDRESSING INADEQUACIES IN THE LAW  
While drawing on lessons from other jurisdictions, this chapter examines proposed Bills 
and Regulations in the capital markets and securities’ sector and discusses them with 
respect to their sufficiency in mitigating the inadequacies in existing law.109 The research 
in this section contributes to the overall study by examining the suitability of proposed 
legislation in resolving the challenges in prosecuting insider trading and as a consequence 
in promoting a fair and efficient capital market required for Kenya’s economic 
development.  
Three Bills are identified among several proposed laws due to their connection with insider 
trading and are examined with regard to their provisi ns relating to inside information, 
material information, publication of information, possession of information by corporate 
bodies and information disclosure requirements.   
The three are the Capital Markets Authority Bill 2011, which makes provision for the 
establishment of the Capital Markets Authority as the regulator of the securities 
industry;110  the Securities Industry Bill 2011, which is drafted with the stated purpose of 
regulating the securities industry and providing investors with protection from business 
abuses and market failures by proscribing insider trading; and the  Securities Industry 
(Continuing Disclosure Obligations of Issuers) Regulations 2011, which proposes to 
govern disclosure obligations of issuers. 
                                                           
109  Other proposed legislations are Capital Markets Authority (Advertising) Regulations 2011; Securities 
Industry (Asset Backed Securities) Regulations 2011; Securities Industry (Collective Investment Schemes) 
Regulations 2011; Securities Industry (Internet Trading) Regulations 2011; Securities Industry (Takeovers) 
Regulations 2011; Securities Industry (Offers of Securities) Regulations 2011; Securities Industry (Licensing 
of Regulated Persons). 
110 Capital Markets Authority Bill 2011 s 4. 
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4.1. Inside Information 
In the previous chapters, it was observed that the term information is core to the 
prohibition of insider trading yet the Capital Markets Act does not give guidance with 
regard to its meaning. Indeed the perception of market practitioners with regard to 
information incorporates a wide range of concepts.111Further, the evidentiary burden on the 
regulator is increased by the requirement to establi h this information as the basis for the 
prohibited transaction. The third weakness that was noted in relation to inside information 
is that the definition of an insider in the Act creat s a causal link between employment in a 
body corporate and acquisition of information hence, th  prosecution would need to prove 
both that the accused had been an insider and that information obtained in their condition 
as insider was the basis of the transaction in question. 112  The dearth of a set of criteria to 
qualify information as ‘inside information’ was also alluded to as a shortcoming of 
existing law on insider trading. Cumulatively, these weaknesses create an onerous burden 
for the prosecution to discharge. 
As discussed in the literature review, these difficult es are not new and have also been 
experienced and mitigated in other jurisdictions. For instance, South Africa’s law sheds 
light on the meaning of inside information because it lays down criteria that ought to be 
met in order for information to qualify as ‘inside information’.113 First, the information 
ought to be specific or precise. Thus, market transactions based on vague or general 
information, rumours, suspicion, conjecture, speculation or combination thereof do not fall 
within the purview of the Act. Second, information must be of a non-public nature in order 
                                                           
111 See Chapter 3.2 Inside Information: The term ‘Information’ Under the Act. 
112 Capital Markets Act s 33(11). 
113 South African Securities Services Act s 74.
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to ground liability. The South African Securities Services Act provides ample guidance to 
assist in making the determination that information has been stripped of its non-public 
character. Any piece of data loses its ‘inside information’ status upon its being made 
public. Thus prompt disclosures of new developments by insiders may significantly reduce 
their exposure to liability for the use of such information in their market transactions. 
Thirdly, the information must have been obtained by a person while occupying the status 
of insider. Fourthly, the information ought to be material; information that is likely to have 
a material effect on the price or value of any securities or financial instrument.  
The UK’s Financial Services and Market’s Act provides an expanded definition of inside 
information in relation to three different categories of securities. In summary the 
information is inside if it is not generally availab e, it relates directly or indirectly to the 
security in question and would, if available, have a significant effect on price. The Act 
then goes ahead and defines the meaning of precise information as information which 
indicates circumstances that exist or may reasonably be expected to come into existence or 
is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn. 114 
With regard to the person-connection approach, it is observable that the position in the 
United Kingdom does not require someone to be an ‘insider’ but only requires that 
someone behaves inappropriately with regard to relevant information not generally 
available.115 Thus, the prosecution does not shoulder the additional burden of 
demonstrating that a person was an insider at the time of the relevant transaction. 
                                                           
114 Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) s 118(C). 




These practices from other jurisdictions are to some extent reflected in the Securities 
Industry Bill 2011 which legislates on insider trading in sections 83 to 87.  The Bill 
defines an insider, the offence of insider trading, i side information and offers criteria for 
what is to be considered as information that has been “made public.” Under these 
provisions, the definition of an insider is simply given as ‘a person in possession of inside 
information.’116 The offence of insider trading is committed if a person deals in listed 
securities or their derivatives that are price-affected in relation to the information in his 
possession.117 An insider commits the offence of insider trading either by disclosing 
insider information to another person outside the performance of employment functions or 
by encouraging another to deal in insider information knowing or having reason to believe 
that the trading will take place.118 
With this new definition, there is a definite shift from a person-connection, to an 
information-connection. Such a shift automatically reduces the market regulator’s burden 
from proving both that a person is an insider and that he person dealt with prohibited 
information to proving only that a person dealt with prohibited information.  
The Securities Industry Bill lays down three criteria which information must meet in order 
to qualify as inside information. First, it must relat  to particular securities or a particular 
issuer of securities as opposed to securities generally or issuers of securities generally. 
Second, the information has not been made public and third, if it were made public, it 
would have a material effect on the price of any securities. The implication of this 
provision is that inside information is no longer an morphous concept, but can be 
                                                           
116 Securities Industry Bill 2011 s 83 (b). 
117 Securities Industry Bill 2011 s 84 (1). 
118 Securities Industry Bill 2011 s 84 (1) (a) and (b).
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identified using the criteria provided. The development of criteria to determine inside 
information is comparable to other jurisdictions, such as South Africa, where the problem 
of vagueness has been eradicated in this manner. That notwithstanding, the proposed laws 
provide criteria for ‘inside information,’ but fail to tackle the meaning of ‘information’ in 
general. As such, the term information could still be used in reference to unspecific or 
imprecise collection of data, vague or general information, rumours, and suspicion, 
conjecture, speculation or combination thereof thereby providing possibilities for casting 
doubts on the prosecution case.  
It is noteworthy, as an improvement of the provision  in the Act, that the Bill makes no 
reference to insider trading as trading on the ‘basis’ of unpublished insider information. 
The market regulator is thereby relieved of the overwh lming evidentiary burden of 
proving this mental element. For instance, had the proposed legislation been applied in the 
context of the Kibaru and Davidson cases, the prosecution would not have been had 
pressed to establish the basis of the sale of share. It would have sufficed to demonstrate 
that the accused was in possession of inside information and that their trade in shares was 
conducted while in possession of that information. It would have been unnecessary to 
attempt the insurmountable task of proving that the trade was motivated by the inside 
information.  
This position was taken into account by European regulators in the judgment of the 
European Court of Justice in the Spector case.119 At the heart of this Belgian case was the 
question of whether one who trades while in possession of inside information is an ‘insider 
trader’ or only those who trade with the intention f exploiting their information 
                                                           
119 See European Court of Justice (ECJ) Case C-45/08 Spector Photo Group NV, Chris van Raemdonck v 
Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie-en Assurantiewezn (CBFA) [2010] OJ 2010, C 51, 6-7. 
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advantage. The court reasoned that an act of trading while being in possession of inside 
information strongly suggests that the information s being relied upon to some extent. 
Thus regulators are entitled to prosecute whenever persons trade while in possession of 
inside information without a need to prove that thedecision to trade was wholly or 
partially based on inside information.120 
In addition, the Bill eliminates the need for a link between employment in a body 
corporate and acquisition of information, which link bears the underlying assumption that 
price-sensitive information is acquired only in the course of employment. The Bill 
therefore removes the possible defence that information was obtained when “it was not in 
the ordinary course of business,” which is available under the Capital Markets Act. It 
eradicates debate around the unanswered questions relating to borderline cases of what the 
ordinary course of business is and what it is not.  
4.2. Material Price-Sensitive Information 
It was observed that the Capital Markets Act lacks definitional precision in relation to the 
term ‘material price sensitive information’ such that ambiguities and doubts can always be 
raised in favour of the accused.121  A problem of narrow interpretation of existing laws was 
                                                           
120 ‘Spector Photo Group’ is a listed company under Belgian Law. In order to implement a stock option 
scheme, which   Spector operated for its employees, th  company bought shares by way of a series of open 
market transactions. A total of 27,773 shares were purchased in five tranches. The last installment was 
bought on 13 August 2003 at an average share price of E9.97. Shortly afterwards, on 21 August 2003, the 
company announced a possible takeover as well as first half-year results for that financial year, both f which 
were perceived as positive news by the market. The pric  per share subsequently rose to E12.50. Later that 
year the Belgian financial services authority held that the company and its director had violated the Belgian 
insider trading rule. The authority pointed to the fact that the last order was not only changed as far as price 
limits and the number of shares were concerned, but also made especially urgent, probably, so the argument 
ran, in order to avoid the acquisition of the last in tallment of shares falling in the period of time when the 
(anticipated) price increase following the announcement of a takeover was being expected to occur by the 
company’s executives. Spector challenged the decision, arguing that the financial services authority had 
failed to prove a causal link between the knowledge of the imminent positive news (soon to be disclosed to 
the public) and the transaction. Pursuant to Article 234 of the EU-Treaty (now Article 267) the Belgian Court 
referred this, among other l questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
121 Republic versus Terrence Davidson, Nairobi CMCC 1338 of 2008. 
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also noted. There was consensus among market partici nts in the survey that financial 
information is material information.122 More specifically, it was argued in the previous 
chapter that contrary to the ruling in The Republic versus Terrence Davidson, fi ancial 
information is indeed material information especially where it has an effect on the price of 
an issuer’s securities or has an influence on investm nt decisions. 
 These difficulties in proof arising from the use of c ncepts that were difficult to define 
such as ‘price-affected securities’ were also noted by authors Swan and Virgo when they 
observed that a number of high profile criminal trials exposed weaknesses in the United 
Kingdom’s  insider trading laws arising from reliance on criminal penalties which were 
difficult to prove. 123  
Drawing primarily from practices in other jurisdictions, one possibility of curing the 
ambiguity in the meaning of material information is to develop regulation that qualifies the 
definition of material information through supplying a list of such price sensitive 
information.124 India has developed such a list and this list includes information relating to 
periodical financial results of the company; intendd declaration of dividend; issue of any 
class of securities; any major expansion plans or execution of new projects; amalgamation, 
mergers or takeovers; disposal of whole or substantial part of undertaking; any significant 
change in policies or company operations.  
In the context of Kenya, a ‘Listing Manual’ was published by the Exchange in 2002. The 
‘Continuing Listing Obligations applicable to all Market Segments’ is a reproduction of 
the Fifth Schedule of The Capital Markets (Securities)(Public Offers, Listing and 
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Disclosures) Regulations 2002, drawn up by the Capital Markets Authority, and is stated 
as such. Although such a list exists, the court in Republic versus Terrence Davidson read 
financial information to mean information that was not material.125 
It is argued that contrary to the ruling in the case Republic versus Terrence Davidson, 
financial information is indeed material information especially where it has an effect on 
the price of an issuer’s securities or has an influe ce on investment decisions.126 This is 
because the list is not exhaustive and having regard to the ejusdem generis rule, the list 
ought not to be interpreted in a restrictive and closed manner. Indeed there was consensus 
in the survey that financial information was material information. It seems clear from this 
evidence that financial information is generally understood to be material information. 
While the Capital Markets Act makes use of the terms ‘unpublished price sensitive 
information’, and ‘unpublished insider information’ interchangeably without providing a 
definition of either, the Securities Industry Bill avoids the use of both terms. Invariably, 
the need for definitions is thereby eradicated.  The Bill however provides as the third 
criteria which information must meet in order to qualify as inside information; that if it 
were made public, it would have ‘a material effect’ on the price of any securities. 
From the foregoing, this paper takes the position that he definition of material information 
in the Capital Markets (Securities) (Public Offers, Listing and Disclosure) Regulations 
2002 as any information that may affect the price of an issuer’s securities or influence 
investment decisions as well as the list provided is sufficient. 
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4.3. Publication of Information 
The analysis of the case of The Republic versus Terrence Davidson in the previous chapter 
provoked the question as to the meaning of publication of information. It was noted that 
this was a gap in the Capital Markets Act since it is silent on when information can 
properly be said to have been published. This raised complexities about whether it matters 
if some and not all information is not in public domain and whether this publication must 
take a specific form. 
This challenge of ambiguity in the meaning of public information has also been 
experienced and solved in other jurisdictions, such as South Africa and United Kingdom. 
As discussed in chapter one, public information has been clarified in other jurisdictions by 
the drafting of a guiding list of situations when information could properly be said to have 
been publicized. 127   Such lists provide guidance in the determination of whether or not 
information has been stripped of its non-public character. Examples of guiding situations 
include when such information is published in accordance with the rules of the relevant 
regulated market to inform investors and their advisors; when it is contained in public 
records maintained by the relevant statutory regulator; when it can be readily acquired by 
those likely to deal in securities or is derived from information which has been made 
public. Information may be regarded as having been made public even if it can only be 
acquired by persons exercising diligence, or expertise or by observation; it is 
communicated to a section of the public and not to the public at large; it is communicated 
only on payment of a fee or it is only published outside the republic.  
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Similarly, the UK’s Financial Services Authority has published the Code of Market 
Conduct (COMC) which identifies a number of factors which the authority will take into 
account in deciding whether information is generally vailable. These include whether the 
information has been disclosed to a prescribed market through a Regulatory Information 
Service; whether the information has been disclosed in accordance with the rules of the 
prescribed market; whether the information is contained in records open to public 
inspection; and whether information can be accessed publicly using expertise and 
resources available at cost.128 
These solutions could provide benchmarks and serve as best practices that may be adopted 
in Kenya where it is found appropriate. It is considered that the development of similar 
guidance could strengthen Kenya’s law and make it more enforceable because this would 
route out this definitional gap identified in the legislation. 
A response to the gap identified in the existing Act with regard to public information is 
underscored in the Securities Industry Bill because it gives insight into the meaning of 
information being ‘made public’.129 Under the Bill, public information includes 
information acquired by the exercise of diligence or expertise, information communicated 
to a section of the public, information acquired only by observation, information 
communicated only on payment of a fee or published only outside Kenya. Information is 
public if it is derived from public information, ift can be readily acquired by those likely 
to deal in any securities, if it is contained in records that are open to the public or if it is 
published in accordance with the rules of a securities exchange. These criteria cure the 
loophole identified in the previous chapter in which a conviction could not be sustained 
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129 Securities Industry Bill 2011 s 86. 
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because part of the information was in public domain. Under the Bill, information is either 
public or non-public, thereby leaving no room for grey areas. 
4.4. Possession and Knowledge of Information by a Body Corporate 
Although the law anticipates the prosecution of corporations for insider trading, Kenya has 
not had any prosecutions involving corporations. The Act foresees insiders as human 
persons as well as corporate entities, but focuses on natural persons. As noted in the 
previous chapter, it inadequately provides for juristic persons, such as corporate entities, 
regarding how they can be considered as insiders. The proposed laws, likewise, lack 
provisions governing the possession of insider information by a company and therefore 
also fall short in this regard. 
 That notwithstanding, an attempt to deal with corporate liability is noticeable in the 
Securities Industry Bill because it holds directors liable where offences by companies are a 
result of the consent, connivance or neglect of the dir ctors.130  It goes further than the 
Capital Markets Act in so far as directors are made more accountable for offences 
committed by their companies thus demanding a greate  sense of responsibility and 
accountability from them.  
By and large, the existing law on corporations as insider traders remains largely untested 
and neither do the proposed laws tackle this aspect of insider trading.  
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4.5. Mandatory Disclosure Requirements: Prompt Disclosure and Reporting of 
Trade  
It was pointed out in the previous chapters that the Capital Markets Act lacks mandatory 
disclosure requirements for the reporting of transactions conducted by insiders as well as 
for the prompt disclosure of insider information. It has also been shown that the duty to 
disclose has been limited specifically to issuing companies and directors yet the definition 
of insiders includes wider group of persons. 
Studies indicate that substantive law on disclosure as well as the prohibition of all forms of 
market abuse, among other factors, form the foundation of strong securities law.131 In the 
literature review, Sharma’s proposals for improving I dia’s enforcement regime include 
the reduction of disclosure time to one day and that disclosure should be made to both the 
exchange as well as the regulator as opposed to theexchange only.132  
Edward Swan and John Virgo likewise note that this gap in protection in the UK insider 
trading laws was filled by steps to make markets more transparent; such steps included 
requiring the reporting of suspicious transactions, disclosing inside information and 
disclosing insider trades in an issuing company’s financial instruments among other 
requirements.  
In considering the deterrence of insider trading through full disclosure it is also appropriate 
to take into account the experience in the United States. Section 16(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934 requires that "every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial 
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owner of more than 10% of any class of any equity security . . . or who is a director or an 
officer of the issuer of such security shall file . . . within 10 days after he becomes such 
beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement wi h the Commission (and, if such 
security is registered on a national securities exchange, also with the exchange) of the 
amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner and 
within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change 
in such ownership during such month, shall file with the Commission (and if such security 
is registered on a national securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange), a 
statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such changes in 
his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month." 
Thus, not only is the insider obliged to file a statement with the Securities Exchange 
Commission indicating changes to his ownership within any given month, the Government 
Printing Office also publishes monthly reports detailing such changes in insider holdings 
and "an active financial press follows and publishes extracts from the statements filed". In 
this manner details of insider trading are given a wide circulation. 
This study considers these proposals both relevant and applicable to the Kenyan context 
because they would make the market more transparent th reby reducing the likelihood of 
the occurrence of insider trading. 
The Securities Industry (Continuing Disclosure Obligat ons of Issuers) Regulations 2011 
attempts to fill the identified gap by establishing a general obligation to disclose. The 
obligation is to disclose material changes or new dvelopments which are not in the public 
knowledge and which are necessary for the financial appraisal of the issuer; that would 
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affect the value or market price of securities or which is necessary to avoid the 
establishment of a false market in securities.133 
In addition, the regulations impose a duty on directors and substantial shareholders to 
disclose their interests in securities of an issuer. This interest is kept by the issuer in a 
register, which is open to inspection by the public free of charge.134Further, by creating an 
affirmative duty of disclosure for companies or institutions that come into possession of 
material price-sensitive information, the Bill attempts to eliminate the very existence of 
material non-public information. This should thereby enhance market efficiency through 
accurate pricing of investment instruments. 
The requirement for directors and substantial sharehold rs to disclose their interests is 
suitable for Kenya because they ensure that the insider’  trades become a matter of public 
record. In this way, directors are deterred from dealing in non-public material information. 
This reporting is likely to enhance market efficiency as it reduces information asymmetry 
and widens the pool of information available to investors.  
However, as noted earlier, the duty to disclose is still confined to directors. It does not 
encompass insiders entirely. In the decided cases for instance, Kibaru was found to be an 
insider without having been a director.135  Davidson was likewise an insider without 
having been a director of the issuer company.136  
                                                           
133 The Securities Industry (Continuing Disclosure Obligations of Issuers) Regulations 2011 r 4.
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Further the bills provide for a disclosure time limit of five days.137 This is too long 
compared to the twenty four hour period proposed in the survey by market participants.138 
4.6. Traversing the Rigorous Standards of Criminal Liability 
On the whole, there is an evident difficulty in the reliance on criminal prosecution to curb 
insider trading. This is exemplified by the challeng s experienced in Kenya as illustrated 
in chapter two. As demonstrated in the literature review, other jurisdictions share in this 
experience and consider the entire criminal prosecution cumbersome and time consuming 
partly because obtaining a conviction requires the proof of the mens rea constituting the 
offence beyond reasonable doubt. For this reason, they have sought various solutions to the 
problem. An example is United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority which has a 
policy of pursuing criminal proceedings only when there is enough evidence to provide a 
realistic prospect of convicting the defendant and where a criminal prosecution is in the 
public interest, considering the seriousness of the offence and the circumstances 
surrounding it.139 Such a policy is an admission of the inherent difficulties in criminal 
prosecution of insider trading. 
The discussion in this chapter shows that the proposed legislations to some extent mitigate 
the challenges identified in the Capital Markets Act. They, however, also present new 
requirements of proof that the prosecution must fulfil. Further, the Capital Markets 
Authority Bill 2011 attempts to improve the enforcem nt process through empowering the 
Authority to conduct its own prosecutions for offenc s under legislations administered by 
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  See Chapter 3.2 The Understanding of Prompt Disclosure. 
139 E. Swan and J.Virgo, Market Abuse Regulation (Oxford University Press, London 2010) 206. 
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the Authority.140 This is in contrast to the current position where prosecutions are 
channelled to the office of the Attorney General, a system which may result in 
prosecutions being conducted by persons who many not have the market regulator’s 
expertise to do so.  
Given that enforcement is a problem in financial crimes generally, criminal offences 
compete for scarce police resources with other seemingly more serious crimes.141 As such, 
breaches of securities laws are unlikely to be seen as priority and it is worth considering 
whether the market regulator is better placed to conduct these prosecutions. Whether or not 
they have the capacity is a point of contention, considering that the prosecution in the 
Davidson and Kibaru cases were conducted by a special prosecutor appointed by the CMA 
from private practice. Indeed, the survey on market practitioners indicated low public 
perceptions regarding levels of and capacity for enforcement of the Capital Markets Act by 
the regulatory body. 
Further, the draft reforms now acknowledge that the proscribing of a variety of activities 
that serve to facilitate the practice of insider trading make the combat of insider trading 
more effective.142 The Securities Industry Bill 2011 does this by expanding the scope of 
investor protection by also proscribing other market abuses that are not provided for in the 
existing Act.143 These include market manipulation; false trading ad market rigging 
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transactions; fraudulently inducing trading in securities; use of manipulative or deceptive 
devices; and false or misleading statements inducing securities transactions. This enhances 
the integrity of the capital market.144 It has also been noted that where the regulatory 
framework effectively controls market abuses such as insider dealing and unauthorised 
disclosures, prospects for building investor and consumer confidence are high, since 
investors tend to target markets that protect them against risks.145  
Despite the foregoing, it would appear important to consider other available avenues of 
enhancing information asymmetry as provided in the Act. This may suggest the selective 
use of criminal prosecution, especially because of its deterrent effect. It also makes a 
compelling case for an increased application of existing civil and administrative avenues, 
whose requirement of proof is on a balance of probabilities and therefore lower than 
criminal prosecution. 
The foregoing discussion shows that the legal arrangements suggested in the proposed 
legislation have been implemented in other jurisdictions. They appear practical within 
Kenya’s existing institutional arrangements and do not require the establishment of new 
structures. It is, therefore, suggested that the proposals in the Bill would assist the market 
regulator, to a certain extent, in lowering evidentiary difficulties occasioned by challenges 
that currently exist in determining what information is inside information. In addition, 
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there is a need to address the other unresolved flaws in order to render the prosecution of 
insider trading a less arduous task. 
4.7. Isolating the Flaws 
The regulatory goal of the Securities Bill is stated as the protection of investors and 
connected purposes. 146 On the other hand, the Capital Markets Act has its goal as the 
development of a fair and efficient capital market in Kenya.147This variation implies a 
transfer of focus from market efficiency to investor protection.  
Although these regulatory goals are different, they are very connected and in some 
instances overlap.148 The renewed focus on investors is perceptible in the provisions of the 
Bill. Illustrative of this is the spirited deterrence of market abuse and malpractices;149 the 
up scaling of fines payable as sanctions and the channelling of all fines towards an investor 
protection fund;150 the introduction of an explicit right of action for damages151 etc.  
Market efficiency, on the other hand, prioritises information disclosure and elimination of 
information asymmetry. In an efficient market, prices fully reflect all available information 
on the stock market and key information is almost freely available to all participants. It is 
arguable that these measures eventually contribute towards the protection of investors. 
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Nevertheless, shortcomings attributable to a focus on the investor and not issuers are 
noticeable in the proposed legislation. These include an absence of a corporate right of 
recovery from insiders who make use of issuer information. The provisions on prompt and 
mandatory disclosure of information are also inadequate. A further shortcoming, albeit 
unrelated, is the existence of gaps in regulatory enforcement measures arising from an 
under-resourced regulatory body. 
• Legislative gaps in the provision on information in general 
As discussed previously, the proposed laws provide more expansive criteria for the 
meaning of ‘inside information.152’ However, there is no criterion applicable to the 
meaning of the term ‘information’ in general. This is because the term information could 
be understood in a variety of ways as demonstrated by the respondents in the survey. It 
could be taken to mean unspecific or imprecise colle tion of data, vague or general 
information, rumours, and suspicion, conjecture, spculation or combination thereof. Thus, 
the concern about providing possibilities for casting doubts on the prosecution case still 
holds true.  
• Inadequacies in the provisions on corporations as insiders and as issuers 
With regard to corporations as insiders, it was noted that the existing law on corporations 
as insider traders remains largely untested. The proposed laws also fail to address how the 
various provisions on insider trading can be applied to corporations. Related to this, is the 
absence of a corporate right of action for issuers.  
A consequence of the emphasis on the protection of i vestors in the proposed laws is that 
attention has been concentrated on the negative impact of insider trading on buyers and 
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sellers of stock while ignoring the corporations and the shareholders who own them. As 
such, issuer companies appear to have been left with no explicit right of action.153 Usually, 
information belongs to the company that issues the securities. This information could 
range from marketing plans to trade secrets and patents. While investors seek the most 
profitable investments for their funds, companies use information to increase the value of 
their shares enabling them to acquire capital more easily.  
It is arguable that the public interest would be served by giving all investors a fair chance 
in the acquisition of publicly traded shares. An element of unfairness arises when 
employees and company insiders obtain benefits that are not available to the company’s 
shareholders as this beats the purpose of their purchase of the shares. This also perpetrates 
the image of the issuer as an ‘insider’s company.’  
As a consequence, it is imperative that a statutory c porate right of recovery for issuers 
whose information has been illegally used and abused in concluding transactions be 
introduced. 
• Prompt and Mandatory disclosure by insiders 
Although the duty to disclose is provided for in the proposed legislation, it is confined to 
directors and does not encompass insiders entirely. The scope of duty to disclose is 
considered narrow and inadequate taking into account the fact that insiders can include 
managers, employees of a company and even providers of services such as lawyers, 
bankers and printing companies. 
Further, the bills provide for a disclosure time limit of five days.154 It is posited that this 
period is too long compared to the twenty four hour period proposed by market 
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participants in the survey. This proposal is consistent with proposals in other jurisdictions 
to have disclosure periods reduced to just one day.155 
• Enforcement 
The effectiveness and dynamism of the market regulator in enforcement of existing 
regulation was questioned in the previous discussion considering that the prosecution in 
the Davidson and Kibaru cases were conducted by a special prosecutor appointed by from 
private practice. Market participants in the survey also doubted the regulator’s capacity 
and expertise to enforce the provisions of the Act unscrupulously.156 Apart from showing 
little confidence in the adequacy of insider trading law, the vast majority of respondents 
faulted the regulator’s desire, enthusiasm and expertise in enforcing the law. 
Enforcement capacity is even more crucial now that t e draft reforms acknowledge that the 
proscribing of a variety of activities that serve to facilitate the practice of insider trading 
make the combat of insider trading more effective.157 This has been done by including 
other market abuses that are not provided for in the existing Act.158 These and other new 
provisions widen the mandate of the enforcement body and create a greater need for 
vigilance and surveillance. They thereby provide a ch llenge to which the market regulator 
is called to rise. 
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Proposed legislation drafted by the Capital Markets Authority make a laudable attempt in 
mitigating inadequacies in existing law. They enhance clarity in the meaning of core 
elements of the crime of insider trading such as insider information and publication of 
information. They also establish mandatory disclosure requirements. In several ways 
therefore, the proposed laws better empower the market regulator to ameliorate insider 
trading, market abuses and failures in the Capital M rkets in Kenya. However, some 
shortcomings such as the ambiguity in the term information and the legislative gaps in the 
possession of insider information by juristic persons still remain unaddressed. 
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION  AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFOR M 
This chapter seeks to summarise the study by highlighting the objectives and findings of 
the study and to make suggestions for reform based on the findings of the research. It is 
hoped that the findings and the suggestions will add to the body of knowledge that will 
inform the reforms in the existing securities legislation. This should in turn enable the 
capital markets accelerate the raising of capital to finance investment in key areas such as 
infrastructure and help propel Kenya to middle income status by year 2030. 
5.1. Summary of Findings and Conclusion 
The objectives of this research were to examine the ext nt to which various provisions of 
the Capital Markets Act impede the prosecution of the offence of insider trading. The 
findings would determine whether legal reforms are ne ded in order to curb insider trading 
and to promote a fair and efficient capital market.  
The literature, statute and case law having been tria gulated with the results of the survey 
bring out a holistic view of the legal provisions on insider trading in the Capital Markets 
Act. Thus, the study’s main findings are that the provisions of the Capital Markets Act 
relating to insider trading are weak and therefore difficult to enforce. Currently there are 
conceptual difficulties in determining the elements of the crime of insider trading thus 
enabling accused persons to utilise the existing looph les to obtain acquittals. That 
notwithstanding, Kenya’s capital market has the potential of being more vibrant and more 
globally competitive. This potential is evidenced by the possibility of reforming existing 
legislation governing the capital markets to effectively combat insider trading. 
The hypothesis of this study was that the provision in the Capital Markets Act relating to 
inside information, material price-sensitive information, publication of information, 
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possession of information and disclosure of information are vaguely formulated and are 
therefore difficult to prove, thus hindering the effective prosecution of the offence of 
insider trading. In light of the findings, it is considered that the hypothesis has been 
proved. 
5.2. Suggestions for Reform 
Relying on the previous discussion of literature, case analysis and comments from the 
market, there seems to be a compelling case for refm of legislation on insider trading. To 
a certain extent, the Bills and proposed Regulations drafted by the Capital Markets 
Authority make a laudable attempt in mitigating some of the inadequacies in existing law. 
On the question of information, the first proposal i  that information should be statutorily 
defined for the avoidance of doubt. The second one is that the mere possession of inside 
information during the conduct of transactions should suffice to ground liability, as 
opposed to the requirement to establish the information as the basis of the trade. The third 
proposal is that the consideration that information s inside information when it was 
‘obtained in the ordinary course of business’ should be eliminated. 
With regard to publication of information, it is suggested that guidelines be established in 
order to assist the industry in dealing with the problem of determining when information 
can properly be said to have been published. Considering that the proscribing of a variety 
of activities that serve to facilitate the practice of insider trading make the combat of 
insider trading more effective, it is also suggested that the scope of prohibited conduct be 
widened in order to incorporate conduct such as market manipulation, use of manipulative 




Since the law does not currently provide for prompt and mandatory disclosure 
requirements for insiders, it is proposed that the affirmative duty of prompt disclosure and 
the reporting of transactions be provided and extended to insiders generally. 
Other suggestions that are not addressed in proposed legislation are as follows: 
Judicial interpretation has read the word material information so narrowly as to exclude 
financial information. Such an interpretation provides a means of escaping liability and is 
contrary to the spirit of the legislation. A broader interpretation is therefore proposed. 
While the law clearly states that insider trading can be undertaken by a corporation, it is 
wanting when it comes to determining how corporations can be considered insiders and 
how they can be considered to have knowledge or possession of information and how they 
can exercise a corporate right of action for damages. Thus, the law appears to focus on 
natural persons, and to this extent it is contrary to the spirit of the legislation. It should be 
read, understood and interpreted with corporate bodies in mind. 
There is a need to overhaul the enforcement effort in relation to insider trading.  If insider 
trading is to be curbed, it is necessary that the regulator is robust, enthused and equipped to 
do so. Problems of proof present considerable obstacle  and so long as this situation 
prevails, alternative enforcement measures such as civil and administrative enforcement 
measures need to be taken more seriously. The challenges entailed in the criminal 
prosecution of offences in the financial services ralm as outlined above also make a 
compelling case for an increased application of existing civil and administrative avenues, 




It is also recommended that further research be conducted into related areas such as the 
adequacy of existing penalties and the effectiveness of civil remedies in order to enhance 
the overall effectiveness of insider trading legislation. 
5.3. Summing up 
This study has examined the provisions of the Capital Markets Act on insider trading in 
light of key learnings from other jurisdictions and Kenyan cases. It identified limitations in 
the Capital Markets Act which operate as a drawback to the efficient and fair operation of 
the market.  If not addressed, these problems threaten to prevent the Act from achieving its 
purpose of ensuring a fair and efficient market. These limitations are in the formulation of 
the elements that make up the crime of insider trading which create loopholes that make 
the prosecution and combating of insider trading difficult. The study has also examined the 
suitability of proposed legislation and made the case for reform having obtaining 
experiences of legal practitioners through a survey. These proposals for reform, discussed 
above, can to an extent effectively deal with the limitations identified in the law. It is 
hoped that the reforms will play a role in raising i vestor confidence in Kenya’s capital 
markets and attract many investors. This will enable the capital markets contribute in a 

















APPENDIX 3: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
CAPITAL MARKETS: A SURVEY OF INSIDER TRADING LAW AN D ITS 
ENFORCEMENT IN KENYA 
I invite you to participate in a survey of capital markets sector. 
The intent of this survey is to provide insight into the legislation on insider trading and its 
enforcement in Kenya. The results of this survey will inform reform proposals to deepen 
the capital market and as a consequence, contribute to the creation of a vibrant globally 
competitive financial sector. I guarantee that any data collected will be treated in strict 
confidence and will not be directly referenced in an oral or a written report.  
General Information 
1. What is your occupation? 
I work in a Law Firm  
I work at the Nairobi Stock exchange  
I work at the Capital Market Authority  
I am an Academic  
I am an In-House Lawyer  
2. Years of experience in Capital Markets Law / Regulation 
Below 2 Years  
Between 2 - 9 Years  
10 years and above  
Introduction 
3. There is a debate among legal and economic scholars as to whether or not there should 
be laws prohibiting insider trading. 
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Which is your approach? Should insider trading be prohibited in Kenya? 
Yes  
No  
4. Do you think investors will be more confident in Kenya's Capital Market if the 
prohibition of insider trading in Kenya is effected? 
Yes  
No  
THEME 1: THE CAPITAL MARKETS ACT, Chapter 485A of t he Laws of Kenya 
6. The Capital Markets Act makes use of the term 'information' in several instances. The 
meaning is not provided. In your opinion, if a person obtained knowledge relating to share 
prices in the sources below, would you agree that this is information?  
    
Strongly 
Disagree 




A corporate advertisement in a news 
paper 
                                   
2. An article in a tabloid                                    
3. Gutter press                                    
4. Office rumours                                    
5. A speculative television news report                                    
6. 
Tales exchanged over an evening drink 
or a game of golf 
                                   
7. 
News gathered from another company 
during an international conference 




THEME 2: INSIDER TRADING 
6. Insider trading can only take place when information is not publicized. Do you agree 
with the following recommendations below with regard to disclosure of information?  
   
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
Prompt disclosure of price-sensitive 
information by insiders should be mandatory  
                              
Transactions by insiders involving securities 
instruments by their companies should be 
made a matter of public record 
                              
 
7. What would you regard as prompt disclosure of information by insiders? 
As soon as the information is received  
Within 24Hrs  









8. From the list provided below, please indicate what you would consider as material 
information that may affect prices of a company's shares. 
    
Strongly 
Disagree 




The acquisition or loss of a 
significant contract. 
                                   
2. 
Information on assets, liabilities 
and cash flows. 
                                   
3. 
A significant new product or 
discovery 
                                   
4. A call of securities for redemption                                    
5. 
A tender offer for another issuer's 
securities 
                                   
 
THEME 3: ENFORCEMENT 
9. The capital Market Authority is empowering to carry out investigation, enforcement and 
sanctions under the Capital Markets Act.  In your view/experience which factor causes low 
enforcement of legal provisions? 
The legislation is drafted in such a way as to make enforcement well-nigh impossible 
The burden of proof is inappropriately placed  






10. How would you rate Capital Markets Authority in terms of the following; 
  Very High High Medium Low Very Low 
Desire to enforce the law                               
Enthusiasm to enforce the law                               
Recourse to enforce the law                               
Expertise to enforce the law                               
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